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In the years since the September 11 attacks, scholars and commentators have criticized
the emergence ofboth legal developments and policy rhetoric that blur the lines between
war and terrorism. Unrecognized, but equally as damaging to democratic ideals-and
potentially more devastating in practical effect-is the expansion of this trend beyond
the context of terrorism to a much wider field of nonwar emergencies. Indeed, in recent
years, war and national security rhetoric has come to permeate the legal and policy
conversations on a wide variety of natural and technological disasters. This melding
of disaster and war for purposes of justifying exceptions to ordinary constitutional and
democratic norms is particularly apparent in governmental restrictions on the flow
of its communications in disasters, as limitations on information flow that might be
warranted when there are thinking enemies (such as in times of war) are invoked in
disaster scenarios lacking such thinking enemies. The extension of wartime transparency
exceptionalism into nonthinking-enemy disasters-reflected in both legislation and
official rhetoric-risks the illegitimate construction of enemies by government, the
unwarranted transformation of public spaces into war zones from which the public can
be more easily excluded, and the inappropriate reliance on notions of the "fog of war" to
justify communication failures and overbroad access restrictions. Only by consciously
disaggregating dissimilar forms of emergencies and removing the rhetoric of war from
disaster decisionmaking can the government make appropriate determinations about
the provision of information in times of community or national crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years since the September 11 attacks on the United States, scholars and
commentators have criticized the emergence of both legal developments and policy
rhetoric that blur the lines between war and terrorism.' The argument-around
which much of the most important constitutional dialogue of the last decade has
revolved-is that this blurring inappropriately gives the government, and the ex-
ecutive branch in particular, too free a hand in creating and implementing measures
that infringe upon civil liberties in the name of national security.2 Scholars have
rightly noted that nebulous labels like the "war on terror" often create unsound jus-
tifications for extralegal or extraconstitutional behaviors3 that, even if legitimate in
times of actual war, threaten to deteriorate core democratic values when stretched
beyond their war-specific boundaries. The academic and social commentary on
this question has been voluminous and heated.4
Unrecognized, but equally as damaging to democratic ideals-and potentially
more devastating in practical effect-is the expansion ofthis trend beyond the con-
text of terrorism to a much wider field of nonwar emergency situations featuring
potential threats to citizens or calling upon government to engage in crisis man-
agement on their behalf. Although the constitutional and policy discussions have
1. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE LJ. 1871, 1873 (2004) (detailing arguments
against framing counterterrorism as war); Stephen Holmes, In Case fEmergency: Misunderstanding
Tradeofs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 301, 303 (2009) (arguing that war rhetoric is
"rhetorical flourish" used to justify unconfined executive powers); Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the
Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
133, 162-64 (2004) (describing abuse of war rhetoric); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive
Power, 93 GEO. LJ. 1213, 1223 (2005) (criticizing how "war" has come to refer to an "abstract
struggle against terrorism generally').
2. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Symposium: It Came From Beneath the Twilight Zone: Wiretapping andArticle
HU Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1419 (2010) (noting the dangers involved in increased
executive power during times of national emergency); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a
State ofPermanentEmergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 706 (2006) ("[T]he 'global war on terror' is being
used to justify a near-dictatorial conception of presidential power."); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of
Prvacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 149 (2008) ("[T]he existence of war does not by itself give a
President any power to act in derogation of constitutional rights.").
3. Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39, 46 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (using
the term "extra-constitutional" powers to mean those that are neither legal nor illegal).
4. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE LJ. 1029, 1032 (2004)
(criticizing abuses committed in the name of the "war on terrorism"); Levinson, supra note 2, at
706 (criticizing the Bush administration's use of war rhetoric); Eric A. Posner, Dference to the
Executive in the United States After September 11: Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal
Counsel, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 213 (2012) (describing the dangers posed by the
"deference thesis").
failed to acknowledge this expansion, war and national security rhetoric has in re-
cent years come to permeate the legal, policy, and scholarly conversations on a wide
variety of nonwar emergencies and disasters. This melding of disaster and war for
purposes ofjustifying exceptions to ordinary constitutional and democratic norms
is particularly troubling in governmental restrictions on the flow of its communica-
tions in disasters, as limitations on information flow that might be warranted when
there are thinking enemies (such as in times ofwar) could be relied upon in disaster
scenarios lacking such thinking enemies. Exceptions to the government obligation
of openness and transparency that emerged in the context of a true, calculating ad-
versary may now be invoked in cases of hurricanes, oil spills, wildfires, and pan-
demics.
The consequences of this melding are grave. If government is permitted to
invoke national security-like exceptions to justify a lack of information access, lack
of disclosure, or lack of honesty in emergencies that are not a war with a thinking
enemy but instead a disaster with a population victimized by natural hazardss hu-
man error, or technological failing, it abandons its democratic obligations of open-
ness without any of the legitimate justifications warranting deviation from those
duties. More significantly, it robs individuals of potentially crucial information at a
time when information may be most necessary and valuable.
This Article argues that a dose investigation of recent trends reveals numer-
ous ways in which the temptation to meld disaster and war may manifest itself in
government information-flow policies, practices, and norms. It suggests that each
of these constitutes a failure to distinguish thinking-enemy and nonthinking-
enemy emergencies and can lead to overzealous squelching of governmental com-
munications. Only by consciously disaggregating dissimilar forms of emergencies
and removing the rhetoric of war from disaster decisionmaking can the govern-
ment make appropriate determinations about the provision of information in times
of community or national crisis.
Part I asserts the normative background position that-barring important
reasons rooted in the protection of the nation and its people-accessibility, honesty,
and disclosure are basic obligations of government. It summarizes the volumi-
nous scholarship asserting the value of governmental openness and transparen-
cy, and adds a more specific analysis of the important reasons for maintaining
5. This Article will use the term "natural" as a convenient shorthand for disasters caused by the
intersection of natural hazards and human society. The term is not intended to deny or discount
the critical human contribution to so-called natural disasters. See, e.g., John Schwartz, Obituaries,
Gilbert F. White, 94, Expert on Floods and Nature, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2006, http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/l0/07/obituaries/07white.html (recounting the conclusion of renowned
geographer and floodplain-management expert Gilbert White that "[f]loods are 'acts of god,' but
flood losses are largely acts of man").
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the background norm of transparency at times of disaster. Although competing
values such as privacy, cost, and the need for candor in sensitive deliberations must,
of course, be considered in formulating specific disaster information policies, sub-
verting this background norm by importing wartime exceptionalism skews the bal-
ancing toward secrecy and impedes the careful weighing that appropriate policy
formulation requires.
Part II describes the exception to transparency norms that arises in wartime,
designed to keep sensitive information out of the hands of a thinking enemy who
would exploit that information to do the country harm. It also briefly explores the
objections that thoughtful constitutional scholars have raised to the expansion of
this "war exceptionalism" to justify access and disclosure limitations in situations
that are not true war but instead acts of terrorism.
Part III argues that the expansion of the inappropriate war analogy is broader
than has heretofore been recognized. It sets forth evidence that the language and
policy ofwartime exceptionalism have crept into the fuller realm of disaster scenar-
ios, in ways that are deeply problematic. This Part reveals recent governmental
behaviors that illustrate the melding of disaster and war, including legislative ex-
ceptions to state open-meetings and open-records statutes and war rhetoric from
executive officials and others at times of nonwar disasters.
Part IV critiques this development, setting forth reasons why a war dynamic
featuring a thinking enemy that can exploit information should be considered cate-
gorically different from nonthinking-enemy disasters created by natural hazards,
technological failure, or human error. It argues that the legal and rhetorical meld-
ing of dissimilar war and nonwar disasters risks the illegitimate construction of
enemies by government, the unwarranted transformation of public spaces into
war zones, and the inappropriate reliance on notions of the "fog of war" to justify
communication failures and overbroad access restrictions.
Finally, this Article concludes by proposing the elimination of legal and policy
determinations that erroneously appeal to a war analogy for a disaster scenario. It
advocates new vigilance among executive officials and policy implementers in dis-
aggregating disasters for purposes of information flow procedures and strategies.
I. THENORM OFTRANSPARENCY
This Article's primary focus is the question of departures from the norm of
governmental openness and transparency and the ways in which justifications for
those departures have become increasingly slippery with the expansion of war rhet-
oric. However, it is useful as a starting point to articulate the "commonsense" and
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arguably "obvious"6 initial proposition that there is, in fact, value to such openness
and transparency. Extensive recent scholarship has debated the appropriate defini-
tion ofgovernment transparency and the specific contours ofthe obligations that an
open government should bear in light of a wide variety of countervailing interests.
Much of this discussion is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, which asks only
whether the particular set of deviations from this norm that arise in a war or nation-
al security context are legitimately applied in the dissimilar contexts of other disas-
ters. Whether the overall norm of transparency should be expanded, contracted,
constitutionalized, legislated, or parsed more carefully, the core assertion remains
that a democratic society both expects and benefits from an open and transparent
flow of information from its government. Understanding what is lost when excep-
tions to this norm are enlarged-and determining whether exceptions that are
crafted in the war context are warranted in nonwar emergencies-requires a foun-
dational appreciation of the basic motivations for and advantages of transparent
government.
Part L.A describes the philosophical, practical, and legal values most com-
monly asserted in the literature in support of transparency norms. Part LB ampli-
fies upon these theoretical and practical principles in the disaster context and
suggests that the virtues of transparency may be enhanced and the need for open-
ness maybe more critical at these times.
A. The Virtues ofTransparency
Thirty-five years ago, Thomas Emerson published his groundbreaking article
Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,8 launching a sweeping modern academic
dialogue9 about the ways in which a system of free expression might necessarily en-
compass more than a "negative right to be free of government interferences" 0 and
additionally embrace a concomitant "right in the public to obtain information
from government sources necessary or proper for the citizen to perform his func-
tion as ultimate sovereign."1 Although his article is widely regarded as founda-
tional in the literature, Emerson was not the first to argue that government
6. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 894 (2006) ("The arguments in
favor of transparency seem fairly commonsensical and perhaps even obvious.").
7. See, e.., id; David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010); Adam M. Samaha,
Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV.
909(2006).
8. Thomas I. Emerson, LezalFoundations ofthe Riht to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1.
9. See Meredith Fuchs,.JudzinZ Secrets: The Role Courts ShouldPlay in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58
ADMVIN. L. REV. 131, 140 & n.40 (2006) (cataloging scholarship on the question).
10. Emerson, supra note 8, at 2.
11. Idatl16 .
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openness, accessibility, and transparency were democratic mandates. He drew
heavily upon the work of Alexander Meiklejohn,12 whose focused view of the ra
tionale for the First Amendment centered on the ability of citizens to receive and
use information relevant to democratic self-governance" and who had argued that
denial of information on public issues necessarily thwarts this core purpose. 14 Em-
erson also grounded his arguments about the "vital importance in a democratic so-
ciety of the right to know" in statements from the Founders,"s including Madison's
celebrated proclamation that "[a] popular government, without popular infor-
mation or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or per-
haps both. ... And a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm
themselves with the power knowledge gives." 6 Indeed, although the contours and
scope of necessary transparency remain abiding fodder for the legal academy, it is
widely assumed that governmental transparency "is clearly among the pantheon of
great political virtues,"' and scholars have articulated supporting justifications for
this norm that range from the highly theoretical to the acutely practical.
Theoretical arguments are built heavily upon a foundation of liberal demo-
cratic theory,' with an emphasis on the ways in which dean flows of information
reinforce governmental legitimacy, inform the consent of the governed, and sustain
the rule of law. Many have noted that a free flow of information from government
to the people in a democracy is a crucial precursor to the exercise of other core
12. See id. at 4.
13. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendmentIs an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255-57.
14. See, e.., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 88-89 (Harper Collins Publishers 2000) (1948) ('The primary purpose of the First
Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear
upon our common life.").
15. Emerson, supra note 8, at 1.
16. Id. (quoting Letter From James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hurst ed., 1910)). Despite becoming the flagship citation for the
proposition of governmental transparency, Madison's "farce or tragedy" quotation may not actually
have related to that topic. See Michael Doyle, Misquotiny Madison, LEGAL AFF., Aug. 2002, at 16,
16-18 (suggesting Madison made the statement in the context of public school funding and not in
the context of government transparency). Although the Founders' commitment to transparency is
the source of much debate, see, e.g., Martin E. Halstul, Policy ofSecreqy--Pattern ofDeception- What
Federalist Leaders Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 COMNm. L. & POL'Y 51, 53
(2002), founding-era statements of the virtues of governmental transparency are plentiful. See David
Mitchell Ivester, The ConstitutionalRirht to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q 109,118-34 (1977)
(analyzing commentary on the subject at the time of the U.S. Constitution's drafting).
17. Fenster, supra note 6, at 888.
18. See Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunliffht in a Shadow " WartFOIA, the Abuses ofAnti-terrorism, and the
Strateyy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1144 ("It is common currency that
transparency is a tonic to democratic legitimacy and to lawfuil government.").
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rights,19 and that "Iw]ithout meaningful information on government plans, per-
formance, and officers, the ability to vote, speak, and organize around political
causes becomes rather empty."20 Because secrecy, dishonesty, and lack of access to
governmental decisionmaking rob individuals of fiull data on which to make core
choices within their democracy, it in turn denies them "the ability to exercise their
rights and liberties, to be free from the unjust and coercive exercise of power, and to
understand the world around them."21 Core rights cannot be protected unless the
conditions supporting the exercise of those rights are safeguarded,22 and thus, as a
starting proposition, information flow is crucial to the entire democratic en-
- 23
terprise.
This tenet resonates within nearly every conception of democracy in Western
political thought.24 A contractual notion of democratic rule, focused on the sanc-
tioning of government by the people, sees honest, transparent, communicative gov-
emment as a prerequisite to informed consent of the govemed 25 and as a vital
ingredient of popular legitimacy. 26 Under the classic Rawlsian political liberalism,
only a society offering fill information on which individuals may base their decision
to associate can generate governing institutions that are understood, legitimate, and
just.27 Modern contractarian scholars have similarly noted that because citizens
cannot be "bound to collective decisions unless they have in some meaningful way
consented," the agreements that form the basis for those collective decisions must
be free from "the inappropriate withholding of relevant information, or there is no
real assent."28
19. See Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Riht to Information, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 357, 364 (2011) ('There exists an almost inexhaustible series of cases in which the right to
obtain information is necessary for the exercise of other political and human rights.").
20. Samaha, supra note 7, at 917-18. (arguing that "[oInly the most modest understanding of the
citizen's role in politics"-an understanding that "could itself foredose the government's democratic
legitimacy"-could be sustained without public information).
21. Pozen, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that government secrecy "threatens the project of collective self-
determination" in a democracy).
22. Peled & Rabin, supra note 19, at 363.
23. Emerson, supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that "if democracy is to work," "[tihe public, as sovereign, must
have all information available in order to instruct its servants, the government").
24. For excellent summaries of the range of theoretical supports for a system of transparency, see general-
ly Fenster, supra note 6, Pozen, supra note 7, and Samaha, supra note 7.
25. See Fenster, supra note 6, at 897 ("Only to the extent that these laws gain the consent of the
governed-which itself can only be freely given if the laws and their enforcement are public-will
the political and administrative authorities that enact and enforce these laws be legitimate.").
26. See, e.g, Mark A. Chinen, Secrecy and Democratic Decisions, 27 QUtNNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2009);
Pozen, supra note 7, at 286.
27. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 454 (1971); see also Fenster, supra note 6, at 896-97
(discussing Rawlsian views of transparency).
28. Chinen, supra note 26, at 4-5.
891Disaggregating Disasters
Likewise, those who conceive of government as an agent or trustee-and
public information as a good held in trust-describe government transparency as a
foundational duty.29 Sometimes, this position is asserted as a baldly proprietary
one-that the "information held by public authorities is, in fact, the property of a
state's citizens and residents" and "[a]s such, citizens and residents are meant to en-
joy free access to it."so Other formulations are more theoretical-that transparency
is required because government is a monopoly from which its citizen shareholders
cannot readily exit, and thus citizens must rely more heavily on information flow as
a source of control;3 or because the tasks of collecting, gathering, and disseminat-
ing information are the core functions government is called upon to perform on
behalf of its taxpaying citizenry; 2 or because secrecy simply "exacerbates the prin-
cipal-agent problem inherent in representative democracy and opens the door to
tyranny."33 Regardless of the precise formulation, the principle is largely the same:
The people, for whom the government works, are owed a transparent govern-
ment, and in the absence ofit, a moral democracy cannot be sustained.
Other theorists center their arguments on the invaluable contributions trans-
parency and governmental information flow make to deliberation on public affairs34
and the attendant obligation of the government to offer dear and public justifica-
tions for all of its actions. 5 Recent deliberative-democracy scholarship draws
heavily upon this so-called "publicity principle."36 Immanuel Kant's foundational
articulation of that principle is that the "transcendental formula of public law"-
the test against which all government action must be measured to determine its
morality and legitimacy-is simply whether the government would be willing to
29. See Peled & Rabin, supra note 19, at 365-68 (describing arguments that the "Government and its
officials" are "trustees" of information "for purposes related to the legitimate discharge of their duties
of ofice" (quoting Austl. Law Reform Comm'n & Admin. Review Council, Open Government: A
Review ofthe Federal Freedom ofInformation Act 1982, Report 77, art. 4.9)); Samaha, supra note 7, at
918 (describing arguments that the executive branch "can be seen as agents of the public charged
with acting for the public's benefit").
30. Peled & Rabin, supra note 19, at 365.
31. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Riybt to Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in
Public Life, in GLOBALIZING RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY LECTURES 1999, at 115, 127-
28 (MatthewJ. Gibney ed., 2003).
32. Harlan Cleveland, GovernmentIs Information (But Not Vice Versa), 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 605, 605
(1986) (arguing that "[g]overnment is information" and that "to consider government information
policy is not far from considering the essence ofgovernment itself').
33. Pozen, supra note 7, at 278.
34. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT
95-101 (1996); Fenster, supra note 6, at 897.
35. SeeJAMES G. MARCH &JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 146-48 (1995).
36. See, e.z., GUJTMANN &TIHOMPSON, supra note 34, at9 95101; MARCH &OLSEN, supra note 35, at
146-48; Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 193 (Jon
Elster ed., 1998).
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make the action public: "All actions which relate to the right of other men are con-
trary to right and law, the maxim of which does not permit publicity," and thus a
policy is morally wrong if it could succeed only in secret." Jeremy Bentham's
utilitarian iteration of the publicity principle conceives of publicity as the prima-
ry vehicle for the development of relationships of trust and accountability with
government; as the people increase their knowledge of the government's
decisionmaking, they participate in meaningful conversation about those deci-
sions and thereby generate "open and free policy."38 Modem deliberativists have
underscored the principle of publicity both as a moral prerequisite and as a tool
for democratic feedback, calling transparency a democratic requirement because
of its role in fostering cooperative dialogue, "broadening ... moral and political
perspectives" of the people and their leaders, and enhancing respectfil debate and
open discussion. 9 In this view, openness of information from government is a
primary criterion of a legitimate democracy because it requires officials to give rea-
sons for decisions and respond to challenges to those reasons.40 Put another way,
in the absence of transparency, dialogue on matters of public concern can never
truly be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"41 a core condition of liberal demo-
cracy.42
These theoretical justifications for demanding a flow of information from
government run parallel to practical and instrumentalist arguments for govern-
ment transparency. 43 Indeed, arguably the most powerful assertions of the need
for transparency focus on the consequences of and incentives created by its absence.
37. IMMANUEL KANT, ETERNAL PEACE (1795), reprintedin THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMAN-
UEL KANTS MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 430, 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For detailed discussions of Kant's publicity principle, see Pozen, supra
note 7, at 288-89, and GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 95-105. Importantly,
Kant's principle is stated as a thought experiment rather than a mandate. See id. at 96. It would
not dictate that all governmental decisionmaking actually be transparent, only that the govern-
ment not take any action that it would not hypothetically be willing to have made public. See id.
at 95-96, 100 (criticizing the approach as insufficient for these reasons).
38. See JEREMY BENTHAM, POLITICAL TACTICS 29-34 (Michael James et al. eds., Oxford Univ.
Press 1999) (1843). For recent discussions of Bentham's contributions to transparency theory, see
Fenster, supra note 6, at 895-96.
39. GUTMANN &THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 100-01; see also Pozen, supra note 7, at 278 ("[B]y
inhibiting input, oversight, and criticism within and outside government, secrecy and
compartmentalization will often lead to lower-quality policies.").
40. GUTMANN &THOMPSON, supra note 34, at 100-01.
41. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
42. Transparency's ability to open policy conversations to wider deliberative scope has also been recog-
nized as beneficial in creating efficiencies within and among governmental agencies. See, e.g., Fen-
ster, supra note 6, at 897, 900.
43. See id at 902 ('The empirical, consequentialist claim for transparency views secrecy's adverse effects
on efficient and effective government as not only separate from, but for some, equal to, normative
claims on behalf ofliberal democratie values.").
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Louis Brandeis's oft-repeated observation that "[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants" 44 highlights the critical role transparency plays in uncovering and
preventing public corruption.45 Citing human nature and real-world evidence of
governmental laziness, abuses of authority, and corruption, 46 commentators have
emphasized the tendencies of those in power to "pursue unpopular and unethical
policies" in secret 7 or to "disclose information that makes the administration look
public spirited, effective, and efficient, but withhold information to the contrary."48
A background norm of transparency imposes significant costs on those who would
threaten the rule of law, elevate "the power of government over the individual,"49 or
otherwise violate the public trust, and, equally importantly, puts the electorate in
the position of dominance, as it is given the tools to monitor, police, punish, and
deter such abuses.50 While secrecy in official decisionmaking and lack of access to
governmental information foster "mistrust,51 "ignorance[,] and suspicion,"52 tranS-
parency permits real and meaningful oversight, cultivates confidence in public poli-
cy, and incentivizes public-serving actions by those in positions of authority.
In the face of these philosophical and practical claims of the necessity of trans-
parency in democratic government, the United States has, in the last half century,
taken legal steps to embrace the norm of transparency both constitutionally and
statutorily. It is far from true that complete transparency and right of access to
government information is a widespread and fully established legal mandate.53
Nevertheless, these constitutional and legislative developments remain significant
44. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'SMONEYAND HOwTHE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
45. See id. at 101-08 (advocating for public disclosure of banking activities to protect investors); see also
Stiglitz, supra note 31, at 13-15; Robert G. Vaughn, Transparency in theAdministration ofLaws: The
Relationship Between Differiny.Justifications for Transparency and Differiny Views ofAdministrative
Law, 26 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 969, 974 (2011) ("Information is necessary if citizens are to hold
government officials and institutions legally [and politically] accountable for misconduct or error.").
46. This threat is particularly apparent within the executive branch. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 274
("[Dleep secrecy in the United States government is much more likely to be an executive, rather than
a congressional or judicial, phenomenon.").
47. Id. at 286.
48. Samaha, supra note 7, at 918-19.
49. Pozen, supra note 7, at 286; see also id. at 278 ('In the absence of perfect virtue, secrecy creates greater
opportunities for officials to pursue personal or partisan gain, to engage in logrolling or horse trading,
and to commit legal and ethical abuses.").
50. See Fenster, supra note 6, at 899 ("The most significant consequences [of transparency] flow from the
public's increased ability to monitor government activity and hold officials, particularly incompetent
and corrupt ones, accountable for their actions.").
51. Stiglit, supra note 31, at 116.
52. Pozen, supra note 7, at 286.
53. See, e.z., Samaha, supra note 7, at 910 ("American law has yet to reach a satisfring conclusion about
public access to information on government operations."); see also Fenster, supra note 6, at 889
("[Tlransparency's status as a legal obligation for government entities in the United States and as an
individual right for American citizens is remarkably vague.").
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as markers of the perceived legal value of promoting transparency and the modem
social commitment to the norm, and they are accompanied by powerful statements
of core principles that might inform discussions on deviations from that norm.
As a constitutional matter, as discussed above,54 legal academics have argued
persuasively that transparency, although not explicitly mandated by constitutional
text, is a necessary and structurally consistent obligation to place upon govern-
ment information holders and decisionmakers.s Scholars urging the con-
stitutionalization of transparency norms have set forth arguments highlighting
constitutional provisions that appear to presuppose or necessitate governmental
communication with the electorate. Although a variety of such textual and struc-
tural arguments have been formulated, 6 the most prominent arguments are root-
ed in First Amendment values of the sort set forth by Emerson. In arguing that a
constitutional "right to know" was an inevitable and inherent corollary to the
First Amendment right to communicate, Emerson noted that transparency
serves the same overarching purposes as speech rights generally. And in the
years immediately following Emerson's explication of the right, the U.S. Su-
preme Court took at least some steps toward its recognition-announcing, for
example, a First Amendment-based right of public access to criminal trials,5 8 and
developing, in the wake of this recognition, a doctrine of access that courts have
extended to civil trials, jury selection, pretrial hearings, posttrial motions, and a
variety of judicial records for which "logic and experience" dictate openness. 59
54. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
55. See Samaha, supra note 7, at 913 (arguing that "[d]emocratic governance is premised on some measure
of public access to information about government operations" and "[laws aimed at regulating
information access help achieve an acceptable measure of exposure, without ieopardizing execuative
efficacy or unduly relying on officials' personal preferences," so "these norms are good candidates for
constitutionalization," and referring to recently drafted national constitutions that adopt transparency
as a constitutional right).
56. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 7, at 295-96 (arguing that the Guarantee Clause and the provisions for
elections of senators, representatives, and the president might support a constitutional norm of
transparency). For a thorough investigation of textual, historical, structural, prudential, and
doctrinal arguments in favor of and opposing a constitutional norm of transparency and access, see
id. at 293-97.
57. See Emerson, supra note 8, at 2 (arguing that the freedom to obtain information is "essential to
personal self-fulfillment," "a significant method for seeking the truth," "necessary for collective
decision-making in a democratic society," and "vital... for effectuating social change without resort to
violence or undue coercion").
58. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the Court found that the expressly
stated guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and petition imply an attendant right to government
information, and that "an arbitrary interference with access to important information" violates the
First Amendment. Id. at 583.
59. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982) (adopting "logic and
experience" test); seealso Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 691 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing cases
applying the test to other proceedings).
Drawing heavily upon liberal democratic theory principles, the Court recognized
the interest in "ensur[iing] that the individual citizen can effectively participate in
and contribute to our republican system of self-government"o and emphasized
that "a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs." 1 First Amendment precepts, although applied only in
particular settings to have come before the Court,62 were nevertheless found to
embody "not only 'the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibit-
ed, robust, and wide-open,'. . . but also the antecedent assumption that valuable
public debate-as well as other civic behavior-must be informed."
The legal groundswell for acknowledging the virtues of transparency and
offering mechanisms for enforcing the norm has been seen legislatively, as well,
in a large-scale statutory movement on both state and federal levels. In the wake
of the 1953 publication of Harold Cross's influential The People' Right to Know, 64
concluding that "[c]itizens of a self-governing society must have the legal right to
examine and investigate the conduct of its affairs,"s6  a freedom-of-information
campaign of grand proportions ultimately produced a sweeping federal Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA),66 similar state information-access acts, and state
sunshine laws calling for open meetings and open records in every state.6 7 Legis-
lative debate at the time of enactment6' and the subsequent characterization of
the legislation by courtS69 confirm an underlying set of assumptions about the
60. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604.
61. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 305 (noting that although "case law reflects cautious support for a publicly
held right to know what the government is up to, . . . [c]ourts have never passed judgment on most
pieces of our immense government secrecy system").
63. RichmondNewspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
64. HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
AND PROCEEDINGS, at xiii (1953) (arguing that free flow of information is a mandate of democracy
and that, in its absence, "the citizens of a democracy have but changed their kings").
65. Id. (emphasis omitted).
66. 5U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
67. Emerson, supra note 8, at 15 (noting "the growing number of federal and state freedom of infor-
mation laws, sunshine laws, and similar legislation"); Pozen, supra note 7, at 314 n.204 ("FOIA
introduced a norm of open access to government documents that has commanded deep public loyal-
ty, taken on a quasi-constitutional valence, and spawned a vast network ofimitator laws at all levels of
United States government and in democracies around the world.").
68. See Fenster, supra note 6, at 898 ("The House of Representatives Report on the original legislation
rested its conclusion about the necessity of a broader, more exacting public access law on the fact that
'[a] democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the elector-
ate varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies."' (alteration in original) (quoting H.R
REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966))).
69. See, e.z., Nat'1 Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) (calling the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) "a structural necessity in a real democracy").
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need for and overwhelming benefits of governmental transparency.70 The legis-
lators who enacted FOIA and the judges called upon to apply it have rooted their
decisions in foundational beliefs that openness and information flow are critical
components of a democracy, the foundations of an informed electorate, and es-
sential to achieving trust in and legitimacy of govemment.7
Taken together, the philosophical, practical, and legal expectations of
transparency and governmental information flow in the United States buttress
a position that these standards ought to be the guiding norms in government
decisionmaking. Although the obligations are undoubtedly less than absolute,
secrecy and withholding of accurate information should be the exception rather
than the rule.
B. Transparency in Disasters
The virtues of transparency persist in times of disaster, both because the
general theoretical and practical justifications for a background norm of transpar-
ency are not altered by the existence of a disaster and because additional theoreti-
cal and practical reasons unique to the disaster context may heighten the need for
transparency.
As a starting matter, the theoretical rationales for governmental transparen-
cy outlined in Part L.A above resonate within the disaster context. During disas-
ters, the people rely on the representatives of their government to offer a clean
flow of information as a fundamental of democratic rule. In fact, nearly all of the
theoretical foundations for transparency in government-including the need for
transparency in the exercise of core rights, the contractualist and trustee views of
modem liberal democratic theory, and the deliberativist publicity principle-
presuppose a citizenry actively engaged in information seeking. Indeed, one of
the primary critiques of these theories has been that the participants in a democ-
racy are actually more complacent, less engaged in communications with gov-
emment, and less interested in gathering the information that government might
provide.72 However, there is strong evidence that citizens experiencing or threat-
ened with immediate disaster do, in fact, actively consider multiple sources of in-
formation about the character of the harm and ways to reduce risk for themselves
70. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 314-15 (noting that FOIA was "developed in response to dramatic govern-
ment abuses," and "grew out of widespread social movements," and that, because its "enactment
entrenched a dramatic normative shift in Americans' expectations of government," "the idea that [it]
might nonetheless reflect or consolidate a constitutional norm has become increasingly familiar").
71. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 6, at 898 (citing legislative history demonstrating this commitment to
transparency).
72. See, e.g., idat 928-29.
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and their families. 3 They behave as active decisionmakers and more closely par-
allel the idealized citizen envisioned by democratic theorists than do citizens in
virtually any other context.
Moreover, the theoretical support for transparency may even extend in the
disaster context beyond the core rationales commonly asserted by transparency
scholars. An additional, underappreciated rationale may be found in foundation-
al concerns about the risks of information paternalism. While one might view
the "search for truth"76 rationale for the First Amendment solely as a prohibition
on government attempts to stifle individual citizens' contributions to that search
for truth, government information withholding predicated on the notion that the
73. See, e.g., ROZ D. LASKER, N.Y. ACAD. OF MED., REDEFINING READINESS: TERRORISM
PLANNING THROUGH THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC 19 (2004), available at http://www.nyan.org
(describing the information demands of individuals facing disaster threats); Sweta Chakraborty, The
Challenge ofEmergency Risk Communication Lessons Learned in Trust and Risk Communication From
the Vokanic Ash Crisis, in GOVERNING DISASTERS: THE CHALLENGES OF EMERGENCY RISK
REGULATION 80, 82 (Alberto Alemanno ed., 2011) (explaining that in disasters "[p]eople want the
truth, even if it is worrisome" and they seek information so they can understand "what they are up
against, in order to have the best chance of figuring out what to do"); Colleen Fitzpatrick & Dennis
S. Mileti, Public Risk Communication, in DISASTERS, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION 71, 74 (Russell R. Dynes & Kathleen J. Tierney eds., 1994) (citing empirical
evidence that, during disasters, most people "do not passively await the arrival of more information,"
but "actively seek out additional information" from other sources to try to verify accuracy of received
information).
74. See, e.g., The Working Grp. on "Governance Dilemmas" in Bioterrorism Response, Leading During
Bioattacks and Epidemics With the Public's Trust and Help, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 25, 31 (2004) (explaining that, during disasters, citizens
should be treated as "decision-makers who are interested in determining the nature of the danger
and acting to reduce the chance of illness for themselves and loved ones"). Internationally, criminal
prosecutions of government officials believed to have withheld information material to the public's
safety during recent disasters have underscored the intensity of the information-seeking desire during
disasters and the public outrage that (even unintentional) information withholding engenders. Sev-
en members of Italy's prestigious National Commission for the Forecast and Prevention of Major
Risks recently were found guilty of manslaughter for allegedly giving false reassurances to the public
about swarm earthquake activity a week before L'Aquila's devastating 6.3 magnitude earthquake
claimed more than three hundred lives. Elisabetta Polovedo & Henry Fountain, Italy OrdersJail
Terms for 7 Who Didn't Warn of Deadly Earthquake, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/world/europe/italy-convicts-7-for-failure-to-warn-of-quake.html.
Similarly, in Chile, National Emergency Office staff are being prosecuted for criminal negligence
after rescinding a tsunami warning in the aftermath of Chiles February 27, 2010, earthquake; the
tsunami ultimately killed more than 150 people. Denis McClean, Chile Still Living With Quake
Effects, U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.unisdr.org/
archive/25366.
75. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 8 (2004) (explaining, in the
context ofFirst Amendment speaker rights, that the idea that the First Amendment "furthers the day-
to-day 'search for truth"' is, at base, "an argument against government paternalism in the realm ofideas
and information" and relies on the assumption "that it is better for each of us to decide [things in the
realm of ideas and information] for ourselves than for government to decide them for us").
7 6. Id
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public will use that information to form misguided beliefs also runs counter to the
basic principle "that it is better for each of us to decide these things for ourselves
than for government to decide them for us." 7 Government is, of course, entitled
to try to influence citizens' beliefs and actions by persuasion, but not by outright
information withholding or misrepresenting what is known. While such in-
formation withholding does not itself violate the First Amendment, it can be seen
as a government attempt to manipulate individual belief formation that strikes at
the core of personal autonomy.79  Such government deception and attempts at
thought control reflect a basic lack of respect for its citizens, and undermine citi-
zens' self-determination and autonomous viewpoint development. Times of dis-
aster have the potential to play a particularly important role in belief formation, as
crises may force citizens to confront profound moral questions-questions cen-
tral to individuals' conception of their selves and notions of the so-called "good
life"-such as the extent to which they are willing to prioritize small risks to their
own safety over much greater risks to others. Government does its citizens no fa-
vors by shielding them from these profound moral dilemmas by attempting, for
example, to downplay the real risks to them and their families. 0 Government
decisionmakers should, instead, do their best to apprise citizens about the risks
they face and then let citizens grapple with those fundamental moral quandaries.
77. Id.
78. There is, of course, a fine line between information distortion, on the one hand, and information spin
or framing that is an inseparable part of both communication and advocacy, on the other. At a min-
imum, however, calculated efforts to distort or withhold information in order to save people from
themselves are inconsistent with the respect government owes its citizens. Moreover, while individual
oficials will no doubt confront difficult line-drawing problems in individual cases, explicating the basic
principles that should guide government information policy will at least provide touchstones for that
decisionmaking, even ifthose principles cannot definitively resolve every difficult case.
79. For a filler exploration of the implications of secrecy for deontological ethics, see Paul Gowder, Secrecy
as Mystification ofPower:Meaning andEthics in the Security State, 2 ISJLP 1 (2006). Gowder argues
that "the self-determination of meaning" is essential to human autonomy and that government
secrecy is a "mystification," which "denies the freedom of another by deceiving that other into
believing that a state which was chosen, and may be resisted, is actually natural and fixed." Id at 10-
11 (citing KRiSTANA ARP, THE BONDS OF FREEDOM: SIMONE DE BEAUvOJR'S
EXISTENTIALIST ETICS 115-16, 140 (2001)). Specifically he argues that "risk-secrecy," when
government knows of and conceals a risk to the public, deprives citizens of "the freedom to make
meaningfil and responsible choices" with regard to that risk and prevents citizens from identifying
and understanding the consequences of choices made both by the government and by the citizens
themselves. Id. at 13, 15.
80. Cf Stacey Singer, Worst TB Outbreak in 20 Years Kept Secret, PALM BEACH POST, July 8, 2012,
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/state-regional/worst-tb-outbrealdn-20-years-kept-
secret/nPpLs (recounting how Florida officials "made a conscious decision not to tell the public'
about a particularly virulent tuberculosis outbreak, in part, because they didn't want to give people
"another reason [to] turn their backs on the homeless").
Rather than circumventing citizens' consideration of deep moral issues by
making those questions appear to be easier and less morally weighty than they
are, government can, if necessary, forbid citizens from pursuing certain courses of
action that it concludes undervalue the interests of others. Thus, while govern-
ment is free to prohibit citizens from undertaking certain emergency protective
measures (like evacuating a particular location or consuming a particular drug)
and is free to bring government force to bear to enforce those prohibitions,"' that
coercive power should not usually include the power to manipulate or withhold
information in an attempt to convince citizens of the wisdom of the government
policy at issue.82 Exercise of the latter power poses serious risks not only to indi-
vidual autonomy but also to government accountability for its policy choices.
Indeed, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has argued that "secrecy is the ultimate
form of regulation because the people don't even know they are being regulat-
ed." 3 Just as there is a strong preference for government restriction of action ra-
ther than speech," there ought to be a strong preference for government
restriction of action rather than information.
The practical justifications for transparency are likewise heightened in times
of disaster. Although one's conceptualization of the dangers and risks of secrecy
during disasters might be informed by one's conceptualization of the motives and
capabilities of government, any view of government should call for transparency
as a practical matter. If government is viewed as untrustworthy or inept, then
transparency serves as a critical check on those in power and sunlight offers a dis-
infectants to the poor choices that officials might make. 6 This is particularly
important in the disaster context because of the broad discretion often granted to
81. These government regulations of behavior should, of course, be rooted in empirical data rather than
myth and should not indulge unfounded assumptions about typical postdisaster human behavior.
82. This argument parallels the fundamental notion in First Amendment jurisprudence that government
is free to prohibit actions but not beliefs and that nonspeech restrictions are always preferable to
speech-restrictive solutions. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 75, at 545 (arguing that, rather than limiting
free speech, the government should choose other nonspeech-related measures to advance national
security).
83. John Podesta, Need to Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OFTERRORISM 220,227 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003).
84. See supra note 82.
85. See BRANDEIS, supra note 44, at 92.
86. It might be argued that later disclosure of governments actions after the danger has passed might
suffice for these accountability purposes, revealing government missteps and policy choices with which
the citizenry disagrees. However, given that individuals will have to make important real-time deci-
sions about their safety and the safety of their property as the disaster unfolds, this context may present
a uniquely compelling case for real-time information provision. Moreover, as the experience in Ka-
trina demonstrates, official narratives of disaster can be remarkably persistent, and early control over
the narrative can interfere with later attempts to hold officials accountable. See infra note 267 and
accompanying text.
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executive officials to respond to disasters." Both legislative specificity and judi-
cial oversight are often lacking in governmental disaster management, making
public scrutiny of and feedback to decisionmakers all the more critical.
If, on the other hand, one conceives of government as largely competent,
well intended, and effective in disaster response, transparency is likewise crucial
to its ongoing operations on behalf of the citizenry. One challenge faced by a
well-intentioned government is to signal to its constituents that it is worthy of
their trust" and ought to be obeyed.90 Information withholding or manipulation
in disasters threatens to undermine public trust in government,91 which in turn
will likely undermine public compliance with emergency response instructions. 92
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170, 5170a (2006) (granting the president broad discretion to declare a "major
disaster," which then allows the president to divert the resources of any federal agency to respond to
the disaster in almost anyway the president sees fit). Most states also grant governors, local officials, or
both broad discretionary authority to respond to disasters, including the power to suspend preexisting
state laws that interfere with disaster response and to impose restrictions on movement. See, e.g., TEX.
Gov. CODE ANN. §§ 418.014-418.018 (West 2012). Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have ar-
gued that given the necessity of broad executive discretion to respond to crises, "political constraints"
imposed by public opinion, rather than "legal constraints," are the true checks on executive power dur-
ing crises. See ERiC A. POSNER & ADRJAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 12-13 (2010). This political check cannot be effective without at
least some degree of transparency.
88. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87; 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006) (providing federal government im-
munity for any discretionary disaster decision made pursuant to the Stafford Act).
89. The definition of trust has been the subject of much scholarly debate, but as Professor Rebecca
Bratspies concludes, "[e]ven without a dear definition, most scholars seem to agree that trust em-
bodies a willingness to accept vulnerability under conditions ofuncertainty." Rebecca M. Bratspies,
Regulatory Trust, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 575,589 (2009).
90. See POSNER &VERMEULE, supra note 87, at 137, 145 (arguing that "well-motivated" executives can
develop "mechanisms of executive signaling' to establish credibility with the public by "taking actions
that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well-motivated ones," such as committing to
transparency).
91. After the Japanese government withheld risk information during the Fukushima crisis, see discussion
infra note 94, a May 2011 poll "showed that more than eighty per cent of the population did not be-
lieve the government's information about the nuclear crisis." Evan Osnos, The Fallout, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 17, 2011, at 46, 57-58. Preliminary empirical data from the Fukushima disaster sug-
gests that the withholding of relevant disaster information from the public did, indeed, undermine
trust in the Japanese national government. See Carola Hommerich, Trust and Subjective Well-Being
After the Great EastJapan Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown Preliminary Results, 21 INVL J.
JAPANESE SOC. 46, 49, 59 (2012) (arguing that, as expected, information withholding post-
Fukushima likely "reduced trust' in the Japanese government's ability to respond to the disaster, espe-
cially among those "personally affected by the disaster').
92. A recent New York Academy of Medicine study of likely public reactions to a dirty bomb attack re-
vealed that compliance with government disaster recommendations is highly dependent on the level of
trust an individual feels in the government. See LASKER, supra note 73, at vii ('[P]eople are more likely
to follow official instructions when they have a lot of trust in what officials tell them to do."). Many
survey participants reported that they were afraid that the government would affirmatively lie to
them-or recommend response measures it knew were not in their best interest. See id at 10. This
effect was most pronounced in minority communities. See id at 11; see also GEORGE J. ANNAS,
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Reports on a variety of different disasters have suggested that withholding
disaster-related information from the public, even for arguably good reasons,
may undermine public trust in government institutions,9 and that public anger
and distrust is particularly likely when the information withheld from the public
would have allowed individuals to make better, more informed decisions about
their own safety.94 At base, the public is likely to conclude that if the government
cannot itself guarantee the citizens' safety during a disaster, it at least owes the
public disclosure of the information it possesses so that citizens may make their
own determinations about how best to ensure their own safety. In any event, a
government wishing to serve the public with what it believes to be a proper rec-
ommendation in the wake of a natural or technological disaster and recognizing
the vital need for voluntary compliance with that recommendation95 should rec-
ognize that dishonesty or withholding of information undercuts public trust and
compliance and that transparency is therefore essential.9'
This is not to say, of course, that full transparency without exception would
be either desirable or workable in the disaster context. As in all contexts, compet-
ing values 97 and concerns must be weighed in crafting individual laws and poli-
WORST CASE BIOETHICS: DEATH, DISASTER, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 213 (2010) ("[T]he key
to any effective response to a public health emergency is an informed public that trusts its
government.").
93. See sources cited supra note 91; see also NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DAM AND LEVEE SAFETY
AND COMMUNiTY RESILIENCE: A VISION FOR FUTURE PRACTICE 124 (2012) (arguing that
withholding dam and levee safety information, even for national security or other reasons, "may
ultimately do more harm than good," by, inter alia, decreasing public "[t]rust in dam and levee own-
ers and government agencies"); sources cited infra note 266; cf Edgar Jones et al., Public Panic and
Morale: Second World War Civilian Responses Reexamined in the Light of the Current Anti-terrorist
Campaign, 9 J. RISK RES. 57, 63 (2006) (noting that during World War II, public trust in govern-
ment and news media in the United Kingdom "was undermined" by overly positive stories and
propaganda when those information distortions were exposed).
94. In Fukushima's aftermath, many of those fleeing the areas closest to the crippled plant took refuge in
an area where government-modeled data predicted the fallout plume would travel. Because that mod-
eling data was not disclosed to the public, many evacuees unknowingly put themselves in harm's way,
"prompt[ing] one local mayor to accuse the government of murder." See Osnos, supra note 91, at 59.
95. Former Senator Sam Nunn, after portraying the president in Dark Winter (a 2001 smallpox sim-
ulation exercise), concluded, 'There is no force on earth strong enough to get Americans to do
something that they do not believe is in their own best interests and that of their families." ANNAS,
supra note 92, at 228.
96. Bratspies, supra note 89, at 606, 623 (identifying transparency-including effective risk
communication and public participation in decisionmaking-as a key component of "regulatory
trust," or social trust in the "administrative" context).
97. Even the most ardent transparency proponents have not proposed absolutism and have conceded
that conflicting values temper the utility, feasibility, and legitimacy of government access and
transparency. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 8, at 4 ("[Ilt is impossible to give absolute constitutional
protection to the fight to obtain information under all circumstances."). Transparency scholars note
that government openness is costly and inefficient, can raise privacy concerns and undermine
cies, and this Article does not purport to answer with specificity all transparency
questions that might arise with relation to disaster decisionmaking. Govern-
ment may also face disaster-specific barriers to information flow, including legit-
imate concerns about how much information can be effectively communicated
and absorbed, limitations brought about by compromised communications infra-
structure, and concerns about diverting resources from problem solving and re-
sponse to information gathering and communication. Nonetheless, this Article
seeks to demonstrate that the strong background norm of transparency translates
into the disaster context and that the importation of wartime exceptionalism
threatens to subvert that norm in the ways described in Part II below. This meld-
ing of war and disaster skews the balancing toward secrecy and obscures the array
of other interests that should be more carefully considered in formulating disaster
information policy.
II. WAREXCEPTIONALISM
A. The Thinking Enemy
Notwithstanding the strong background norm of governmental infor-
mation flow and the solid status of transparency as a democratic prerequisite, one
clear exception to these principles has been almost uniformly embraced. It takes
the form ofwhat might be labeled war exceptionalism.
Both the enforcement of positive limitations on private speech and cessation
of the government obligations of information flow and transparency have been
recognized as necessary and appropriate when designed to thwart the purposeful
exploitation of the information by a thinking enemy who is a current or potential
wartime threat.98 Although, as discussed below, the scope of these exceptions has
thoughtful deliberation, and may facilitate rent seeking and other harmful behaviors. See, e.., Fenster,
supra note 6, at 902-10 (describing transparency's limitations, induding its tendency to "raise the fiscal
costs of government," to impose "prohibitive logistical problems and expenditures," to "infringe upon
the privacy interests of individuals who give personal information to the government," and to "harmH
government decisionmaking by adversely affecting the ability of government officials to deliberate over
policy matters outside of the public eye"); Samaha, supra note 7, at 922 ("Unfettered access to govern-
ment information will cripple the state's public-regarding efforts as much as anything else," because
"[olpenness exposes not just waste, fraud, and abuse, but also ... candid advice, intimately private in-
formation, and trade secrets" and because "[a] rule of fill disclosure might also prompt officials to
sanitize the public record as it is created").
98. See, e.., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) ('The Government has a
compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security
and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence
service.").
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been hotly debated, and concerns over their inappropriate invocation run deep, 99
even the most ardent proponents of government accessibility and transparency
acknowledge at least the "very narrow"100 brand of war exceptionalism that calls for
"sensitive national security data" 01 to be kept secret from the public so as to ensure
that it is also kept secret from enemies "with [an] intent to injure the United
States." 102
Although perhaps once partially grounded in the now-rejected position that
the First Amendment justified restrictions on communications in the name of
preserving public morale and eliminating dissent that even potentially hindered a
war effort,103 the primary and enduring rationale for wartime exceptionalism of the
government's information-disclosure obligations is that some information might
be used by "evildoers"104 with a calculated desire to take advantage of public infor-
mation in an ongoing destructive scheme.105 As a theoretical matter, it is widely
acknowledged that the presence of a potentially information-exploiting thinking
enemy tilts the transparency scales because "forced disclosure creates a nation that
is more susceptible to security breaches and less able to enforce its own laws" by
giving thinking enemies "greater access to information that could be used to
threaten the health and safety of the public." 06 Thus, notwithstanding the virtues
99. See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 107 (2006) (arguing that "[g]overnment agencies frequently classify
material not because it contains secrets that would endanger the nation if revealed to the public but
because publication would embarrass the agency by revealing its mistakes or would provide helpful
information to a rival agency' and that this "[o]verclassification creates a culture of secrecy that
inhibits the production and flow of information to which the public should be entitled"); STONE,
supra note 75, at 546-47 (arguing that national security "[o]fficials who can mask their decisions
behind a screen of self-invoked secrecy are sure to abuse their authority" and that there exists a
pathologically"excessive restriction of civil liberties in wartime").
100. Emerson, supra note 8, at 17.
101. Id. (arguing that the limitation should extend only to information about "tactical military
movements, design ofweapons, operation of espionage or counterespionage, and similar matters").
102. Id. atl18.
103. See, e.., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("When a nation is at war many things
that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional
right.").
104. Fenster, supra note 6, at 906.
105. See Ackerman, supra note 1, at 1889 ("[T]ightened restrictions on access to hitherto-public
information and facilities ... [are] precisely the sorts of restrictions that may significantly reduce the
risk of a second strike." (quoting Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-emergency
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801,1830 (2004))).
106. Fenster, supra note 6, at 906; see also Samaha, supra note 7, at 922 (explaining, as a reason why
"[unfettered access to government information" is untenable and not public-serving, that
"[olpenness exposes not just waste, fraud, and abuse, but also baffle plans, rand] law enforcement
sources"); Pozen, supra note 7, at 304 (discussing the ways in which "executive branch secrecy in the
of transparency, secrecy proves "valuable for concealing plans and vulnerabilities
from adversaries, acting quickly and decisively against threats, protecting sources
and methods of intelligence gathering, and investigating and enforcing the law
against violators."'0o Intentional withholding of information that is motivated
by these concerns is thought to be even more public-serving and democracy-
enhancing than governmental transparency and access, as it is the only clear mech-
anism for protecting the nation from the thinking, adaptive enemy who would take
advantage ofpublic information flow to do the nation and its people harm.108
This war exceptionalism, condoning secrecy in the interest of protecting the
nation from a thinking enemy, has been incorporated doctrinally into common
law, legislative, and constitutional schemes that otherwise carry a strong pre-
sumption of access and transparency.109
The Supreme Court has made dear that even as to the fundamental indi-
vidual liberties associated with freedom of speech and in the context of deeply
disfavored prior restraints on the press, war exceptionalism justifies limitations on
military information that could be exploited by those who would harm national
security1'0 or that would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable dam-
age to our Nation or its people.""' In overcoming the ordinary free speech
norms, the doctrine focuses on the existence of the third-party adversary and the
uses to which that adversary would put the information.
A parallel exceptionalism, likewise focused on this adversarial national secu-
rity risk, is well established in the statutory and other legal obligations of govern-
mental access and transparency. From the time of the nation's founding, the duty
of the government to reveal information to the public and provide access to oth-
erwise public documents and places has been tempered by a recognized need to
protect national security from ill-intended information exploiters.112 At the Vir-
ginia ratifying convention in 1788, George Mason said, "[i]n matters relative to
service of national defense, will be tolerated to a significant degree" in order to keep the country safe
from enemy actions).
107. Pozen, supra note 7, at 277.
108. See Fenster, supra note 6, at 906; see also STONE, supra note 75, at 9 (cataloging reasons government
might want to suppress free speech during wartime, including possible "disclos[ure of] information
that is useful to the enemy').
109. For a discussion of these common law, legislative, and constitutional schemes, see supra notes 53-71
and accompanying text.
110. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location oftroops.").
111. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
112. See, e.z., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 345 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed.,
2008) (listing "secrecy[] and dispatch" among the executive branch qualities that are critical to
conducting war).
905Disaggregating Disasters
906 60 UCLA L. REV. 884 (2013)
military operations, and foreign negotiations, secrecy [is] necessary sometimes."
As legal constructs have developed to ensure transparency and access, this
exceptionalism has been enshrined within them, establishing exemptions that
trump the transparency norm when a thinking enemy exists. Notably, FOIA has
an explicit national defense exception,'14 informed by pre-existing executive
schemes for classification of national security information that were plainly de-
signed to thwart thinking-enemy exploitation.s15 Other FOIA exceptions may al-
so be invoked to prevent thinking-enemy use of information about investigations
and intelligence operations.' 1 6 This statutory recognition that "public disclosure is
not always in the public interest,"' 17 reflects an uncontroverted commitment to "al-
low[ing] the Government to protect from the scrutiny of this Nation's enemies
classes of information that warrant protection."1 8
The law of access and attendant doctrines of press freedom likewise have
been limited by the constraints of war and the existence of a calculating adver-
sary in the national security realm."' Media access to war zones may constitu-
tionally be restricted,120 and exceptions to the courtroom openness mandated by
113. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F2d 144,155 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 326 (rev. ed. 1966)); id. at 160 ("Our survey of historical
evidence persuades us that secrecy of intelligence efforts, including expenditures, was a practice of
General Washington during the War for Independence," that the framers "intended Congress and
the President to have discretion to maintain" such secrets, and that they implemented this excep-
tionalism by statute); see also NY Times Co., 403 U.S. at 728 ("[S]uccessful conduct of international
diplomacy and the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and
secrecy.").
114. See5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) ("[FOIA] does not apply to matters that are ... (A) specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interests of national
defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order .... ).
115. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049, 7051 (Nov. 5, 1953) (citing, as examples of
classifiable material, information that would harm U.S. defense interests if disclosed because an enemy
could exploit the information to harm the country).
116. Some exemptions for law enforcement records are designed to prevent exploitation of information by
wrongdoers. See, e.., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (E)-(F) (exempting "records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes," when they "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings," when they would reveal law enforcement techniques that create a risk of "circumvention
of the law," and when they "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any
individual'). Additionally, FOIA exempts documents "specifically exempted from disclosure by
[another] statute," id. § 552(b)(3), which incorporates numerous war- and intelligence-based
nondisclosure statutes.
117. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,167 (1985).
118. Id. at 183 (MarshallJ., concurring).
119. For thorough examinations of war exceptionalism involving the press, see generally JEFFERY A.
SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE POWER (1999),
STONE, supra note 75, and David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press in Wan'ime, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 49(2006).
120. See, e.g., Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 355 F.3d 697, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting the assertion of publisher
Larry Flynt that there exists a "First Amendment fight for legitimate press representatives to travel
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RichmondNewospapers, Inc. v. Virginia are recognized, when secrecy is necessary
to protect technology and methods of intelligence gathering from thinking enemies
and to thereby retain their usefulness to the national defense.122 The so-called
state secrets doctrine establishes an evidentiary privilege to conceal information
exploitable by enemieS123 and bars suits entirely when the main issue is a state se-
cret' 24 of that nature. In such cases, transparency is transformed from a govern-
ment obligation to a matter "beyond judicial scrutiny,"125 in the name of protecting
the citizenry. Although the application of the doctrine is rightly limited to in-
formation that would in fact create this harm to national security, "even the most
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ulti-
mately satisfied that military secrets are at stake." 126
B. War Exceptionalism in Terror
Although war exceptionalism in its narrowest form is largely uncontrover-
sial, in the years since the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, it has
become a topic of vehement debate, as scholars, civil libertarians, and media or-
ganizations have criticized the government for what has been described as an un-
justifiable, pretextual, and undemocratic expansion of the exception to the "war
on terror."127 Critics have charged that governmental constrictions on the appli-
with the military' and to be "facilitated by the military in their reporting efforts during combat, subject
only to reasonable security and safety restrictions").
121. 488 U.S. 555 (1980).
122. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) ("It maybe possible to satisfy the court ... that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged."); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 763 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (reasoning that the disclosure of intelligence methods could enable hostile governments to
manipulate domestic intelligence gathering).
123. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court formally recognized the "state secrets" evidentiary privilege to conceal
information, the revelation of which would threaten military or diplomatic interests of the nation.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
124. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (dismissing a suit against the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) for breach of contract to provide financial and other support in exchange for espionage services
because "the very subject matter of the action ... was a matter of state secret" (quoting Reynolds, 345
U.S. at 11 n.26)).
125. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981) (dismissing a
suit to compel the U.S. Navy to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement regarding a military
facility where it might store nuclear weapons because "[d]ue to national security reasons," the Navy
could not admit or deny its plans).
126. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11.
127. William Zolla II, The War at Home: Rising Tensions Between Our Civil Liberties and Our National
Secuity, CBA REC., Feb./Mar. 2003, at 32, 32 (noting that a "broad coalition" of critics "contend that
the Governmentfs zealous pursuit of terrorists is being waged with little regard for the rights of accused
suspects or their families, and largely beyond the view of the public'); see also Bill Carter & Felicity
Barringer, In Patriotic Time, Dissent Is Mutedt Debate Grows Over Balancing Security and Free Speech,
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cation of FOIA,128 increased classification of documents,129 and U.S. Department
of Homeland Security measures calling for governmental secrecy in the name of
combatting terrorism 3 o all inappropriately shift the balance away from transpar-
ency. They have likewise condemned secrecy that prevents public scrutiny or
constitutional challenge of other counterterrorism measures, including govern-
ment invocations of war exceptionalism in its refusal to reveal facts related to ex-
ercises of the Patriot Act'"' surveillance powers, 132 torture and interrogation tech-
techniques,133 the names of detainees believed to be connected to terror attacks,
and other information on alleged enemy combatants. 134  Similarly, many have
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at Al (voicing concern that the post-September 11 climate tempered
free speech and giving examples of many who criticized the government and the negative conse-
quences that followed).
128. See, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, Transparency andAccountability in a Time f Terror: The BushAdministration's
Assault on Freedom of Information, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 479 (2006) (criticizing the Bush
administration's use of FOIA exceptions to keep information confidential); Timothy W. Maier, Bush
Team Thumbs Its Nose at FOlA, INSIGHT, Apr. 29, 2002, at 20 (criticizing former Attorney General
Ashcroffs post-September 11 FOIA memorandum to agencies, which has been described as
encouraging agencies "to be more aggressive in denying FOIA requests and not be concerned about
going to court").
129. See, e.g., Derigan A. Silver, National Security and the Press: The Government's Ability to Prosecute
Journalistsfor the Possession or Publication ofNational Security lnformation, 13 COMM. L. & POL'Y 447,
449-50 (2008) (documenting and criticizing increased classification after September 11).
130. Created in November 2002 to protect against and respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security was given statutory power over "critical infrastructure
information," 6 U.S.C. § 133(e)(1) (2006), and "the protection and maintenance of the confidentiality
of such information." Id § 133(e)(2)(D). A new statutory exemption from FOIA for infrastructure
information was also enacted. See Silver, supra note 129, at 449-50 (criticizing the creation of "ad-
ditional exemptions to the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for critical infrastructure
information").
131. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered
sections ofthe U.S. Code).
132. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 18, at 1168-69 (criticizing the potential for new government surveillance
powers under the Patriot Act to violate individual rights and the Bush administration's "gambit ofpas-
sive resistance' in response to Patriot Act FOIA requests).
133. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html
(reporting the existence of "black sites" where the United States detains terror suspects, which
"depend[] on ... keeping even basic information about the system secret from the public"); see also
Mark Mazzetti, CIA Was Urged to Keep Interrogation Videotapes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/08/washington/08intel.html (reporting the destruction of hun-
dreds of hours ofvideo recording ofthe interrogations ofAl Qaeda operatives).
134. Editorial, Why Not Disclose?, WASH. PosT, Oct. 31, 2001, at A26 ('The Department of Justice
continues to resist legitimate requests for information regarding the 1,017 people it acknowledges
having detained in its investigation of the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
Civil liberties and other groups have been reduced to filing a request for the data under the Freedom of
Information Act."); see also Kreimer, supra note 18, at 1166 (criticizing government redaction of the
names of Guantanamo detainees being held as enemy combatants and charging that refusal to release
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balked at access restrictions under which ordinary presumptions of openness in
hearings and trials have been overcome by government assertions of "war on ter-
ror" concerns. 135
Thus, critics charge that, in the context of terror, war exceptionalism has
been stretched beyond its proper application to a true war against an opposing
nation state to create an unjustified culture of secrecy that is inconsistent with
democratic norms and good government.' 6 A central concern about war-on-
terror secrecy is that the secrecy has shrouded from public view violations of both
constitutional rights and international human rights.137 This concern has been
compounded by accusations that terrorists would not actually be able to exploit
much of the information that has been withheld and by related accusations that
the asserted thinking-enemy justification is a mere pretext for more nefarious
motivations, such as avoiding embarrassment to the government and limiting
public scrutiny of, and government accountability for, key policy decisions. 138
the names "hinder[ed] efforts to evaluate the fairness of the proceedings and the plausibility of the
charges").
135. See, e.g., Paul Haridakis, Citizen Access and Government Secrecy, 25 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 3,
19-21 (2006) (criticizing closure of presumptively open deportation hearings and access restrictions
on trials).
136. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 75, at 556 ("An even more troubling free speech issue arising out of the
'war' on terrorism concerns the Bush administration's obsession with secrecy."); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 352, 373 (2010) (noting the Bush administration maintained that the threat
of terrorism required "operating in secret and sometimes 'work[ing] . . . the dark side' to fight the
forces of evil" (alterations in original) (quoting Dan Froomkin, Cheney's 'Dark Side' Is Showing,
WASH. POST WHITE HOUSE WATCH (Nov. 7, 2005, 1:21 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/blog/2005/11/07/BL2005110700793.html)); Anthony
Lewis, Security and Liberty: Preserving the Values ofFreedom, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS:
CIVILLIBERTES INAN AGE OF TERRORISM, supra note 83, at 47, 50-51 (arguing that the war on
terror "provides more potential justifications for secrecy' because the war has no obvious end, and the
enemy is not well defined and may strike anywhere "in myriad ways"); Podesta, supra note 83, at
225-26 (arguing that "legitimate desire for operational security" has become "an excuse for sweeping
policies that deny public access to information and public understanding of policymaking" and
weaken "our democratic institutions").
137. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the "'War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1073
(2008) (criticizing horrendous mistreatment of prisoners in "secret U.S. detention facilities around
the world"); Bob Herbert, Who Are We?, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A25 (criticizing both
President Obama's and President Bush's efforts to conceal previous abuses).
138. See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, War and theAmerican Constitutional Order, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that secrecy
"bleeds" and "expands beyond the realm necessary for sustaining successful military operations");
Kitrosser, supra note 2, at 1419 (arguing that "the presidencys structural capacity for secrecy' can
easily defeat accountability, particularly post-9/11); Podesta, supra note 83, at 231 ("[T]he
government is concealing important actions with only the most convoluted connections to the war
against terrorism."); id. at 225-28 (arguing that the government does so to prevent democratic
accountability).
Moreover, critics argue that restricting information flow to the public to prevent
that information from reaching enemy hands involves serious tradeoffs because,
in contrast to a traditional war-or at least all of the traditional wars that the
United States has fought against foreign enemies, which have been fought almost
entirely away from American soil-noncombatant citizens have an important
role to play in both terrorism prevention and response.139
Yet, while this debate has raged on, critics that have condemned the exten-
sion of wartime transparency exceptionalism to terror have failed to recognize that
this expansion has actually been far more sweeping. While this uproar over the in-
vocation of wartime transparency exceptionalism in terror has been occurring,
government decisionmakers have likewise engaged in an unacknowledged ex-
pansion of this exceptionalism to the realm of natural and technological disasters.
This expansion is all the more incongruous and troubling because disasters are
even more obviously dissimilar to war than is terror. War and terrorism at least
share the core commonality of a thinking enemy. Conversely, and importantly,
the heretofore unrecognized expansion of war exceptionalism to nonterror disas-
ters, described in the next Part, lacks even this commonality.
III. THEMELDING OFWARAND DISASTER
The bleed of wartime secrecy justifications beyond the terrorism context
and into the even less analogous disaster context has come about through several
subtle but significant means. One is legislative, as classic wartime exceptionalism
in the realm of transparency has been extended in state sunshine laws not just to
terrorism, but to nonthinking-enemy disasters, as well. Beyond this, the rhetoric
ofwar has also been making steady inroads into both official and public discourse
about natural and technological disasters.140 This Part reveals how the tempta-
139. See, e.g., STEPHEN FLYNN, THE EDGE OF DISASTER: REBUILDING A RESILIENT NATION 17
(2007) (arguing that the "deeply embedded culture within the national defense and federal law en-
forcement communities that embraces secrecy and prevents public disclosure of information" is a "pa-
temalistic[]" mistake that undermines the role of "everyday citizens ... as potential allies in advancing
our security"). Depriving citizens of information hamstrings their ability to participate in terrorism
prevention and response and may ultimately increase the country's vulnerability. See id. Additionally,
critics argue that restricting public information about critical infrastructure vulnerabilities because that
information might be exploitable by terrorists can severely hamper a communitys ability to prepare for
and respond to other types of hazards, such as dam failure. See, e.g., NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 93, at 5,40 (reporting, in the context of dam and levee safety, that existing limitations on in-
formation, motivated by terrorism fears, "restrict access to information critical to public risk awareness,
mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and community capacity for adaptation").
140. Indeed, Professor Bruce Ackerman, one of the most vocal opponents of the war on terror, has
advocated countering the framing of terrorism as "war" by creating a "third way," between terrorism
as crime and terrorism as war, the "state of emergency," modeled on the nation's longstanding
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tion to meld disaster and war has taken hold, first, in the open meetings and rec-
ords laws of many states and, second, in the public narrative of disaster.
A. State Sunshine Law Exemptions
The events of September 11 spurred a wave of legislative activity creating
new exceptions to state open meetings and records laws. This expansion of
longstanding wartime exceptionalism to cover the country's new enemies-
terrorists-also swept within its ambit other types of disasters, as many of these
new state sunshine law exceptions apply by their terms to both terrorism and oth-
er categories of disasters.
Even before September 11, a fair number of states had passed exceptions to
their state open meetings laws,141 exempting from state open-meeting require-
ments matters generally related to emergencies or public safety threats, whether
experience with emergency declarations for natural disasters such as hurricanes and epidemics.
Ackerman, supra note 1, at 1873, 1904. This solution is far less persuasive, however, if the disaster-
model for Ackerman's third way has itselfbeen infused with the rhetoric ofwar.
141. See, e.g., Act ofjuly 18, 1988, ch. 419, § 1, 66 Del. Laws 869, 869 (1988) (codified at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 1000 4 (g)( 3) (2003)); Act ofjune 2, 1975, H.B. No. 126, § 1, 1975 Haw. Sess. Laws
364, 364-66 (codified at HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-4, 92-5(a)(6), 92-8 (LexisNexis 2012));
Act of June 2, 2000, Pub. Act No. 91-0730, § 5, 2000 Il. Laws 1074, 1075 (codified at 5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/2(c)(8) (West 2005 & Supp. 2012)); Act of Aug. 5, 1976, Act No. 665,
§ 1, 1976 La. Acts 1719, 1720-21 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:16, 42:17(A)(5) (Supp.
2012)); Act of Nov. 19, 1981, Act No. 21, § 1, 1982 La. Acts 2151, 2152 (codified at LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 42:18(A)(6) (Supp. 2012)); Act ofMay 24, 1991, ch. 655, § 1, 1991 Md. Laws 3506,
3517-18 (codified at MD. CODEANN., STATE GOVT § 10-508(a)(10) (LexisNexis 2009)); Act of
Mar. 31, 1981, ch. 456, § 1, 1981 Miss. Laws 1052, 1052-53 (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-
41-7(4)(f) (2012)); Act of Apr. 21, 1975, ch. 491, § 3, 1975 Mont. Laws 1300, 1301-2 (codified at
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-112 (2011)); Act of May 27, 1975, L.B. 325,1975 Neb. Laws 670,671
(codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1410(1)(b) (2008)); Act of Oct. 21, 1975, ch. 231, 1975 NJ.
Laws 957, 960-61 (codified at NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12(b)(6) (West 2002 & Supp. 2012)); Act
Effective Jan. 1, 1977, ch. 330, § 2, 1976 RI. Pub. Laws 1509, 1511 (codified at R.I. GEN LAWS §
42-46-5(a)(3) (2007)); Act ofjuly 18, 1978, No. 593, § 8, 1978 S.C. Acts 1736, 1740 (codified at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-70(a)(3) (2007)); Act ofMay 22, 1993, ch. 268, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws
583, 590 (codified at TEX. GoVT CODE ANN. § 551.076(1) (West 2012)); Act ofMar. 2,1977, ch.
180, § 5, 1977 Utah Laws 732, 734 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-205(1)(f) (LexisNexis
2010 & Supp. 2012)); Act of Apr. 23, 1973, No. 78, § 2, 1973 Vt. Acts & Resolves 218, 220
(codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 313(a)(5) (2010 & Supp. 2012)). A few pre-September 11
open meeting law exceptions use broad national security language. See, e.g., Open Public Meetings
Act of 1971, ch. 250, § 11, 1971 Wash. Sess. Laws 1113, 1116 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 42.30.110(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012)) (allowing "executive sessions during a regular or special
meeting to consider matters affecting national security"). While these exemptions would probably
not have been construed to cover either natural hazards such as pandemics or hurricanes or
technological disasters a decade ago, the post-September 11 reconceptualization of natural hazards
and technological disasters as national security threats suggests that those exceptions might be
construed, today, to cover those types of emergencies.
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the threats arose from terrorism, accidents, or causes that are more natural.142
Prior to September 11, a handful of states had also passed exceptions to their open
records laws for records, the disclosure of which could endanger public safety, re-
gardless of the nature of the associated threat.143
The attacks of September 11 unleashed a flurry of state legislative activity en-
acting new exemptions to state sunshine laws for information related to emergen-
cies and public safety threats. Much of the impetus for limiting public access to
information relating to emergencies, and to public safety more generally, was
dearly post-September 11 fear that terrorists would exploit the public availability
of such information to hone in on identified weaknesses in public security and
public infrastructure or otherwise identify potential targets. However, while these
laws were presumably aimed primarily at the terrorism thinking-enemy dynamic,
the exceptions as written and adopted actually expand wartime transparency
exceptionalism not only to terrorism but also to a wide variety of nonthinking-
enemy disasters, as the language of many of the exceptions is broad enough to cov-
er both types of contingencies.
Nearly twenty states, for example, passed new open meetings exceptions
with language that appears to allow invocation of the exception in both terrorism
and nonthinking-enemy disaster situations.144 Many of these new open-meeting
142. Some of these exceptions are quite broad in terms of the substantive content that can be
considered during the dosed meeting, but limit invocation of the exception to times of
emergency. For example, Louisiana's open meeting law permits a public body to hold a dosed
executive meeting in "[c]ases of extraordinary emergency, which shall be limited to natural
disaster, threat of epidemic, civil disturbances, suppression of insurrections, the repelling of
invasions, or other matters of similar magnitude." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:16, 42:17(A)(5).
Other state exceptions, in contrast, exempt only certain narrow matters from open meeting
requirements, but allow dosed sessions outside of an immediate emergency. The South
Carolina law, for example, allows dosed meetings for "[d]iscussion regarding the development of
security personnel or devices." S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-70(a)(3) (2007).
143. See, e.g., Open Records Act, ch. 187, § 7, 1984 Kansas Sess. Laws 969, 974-75 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-221(a)(12) (2002)); Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 933, § 1,1977 N.Y. Laws, ch. 933,
1,1-2 (codified at N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(f) (McKinney 2008)); Act ofMay 5, 1979, ch. 202,
§ 1,1979 R.I. Pub. Laws 782,783-85 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(5)(i)J) (2011)).
144. Many of these open meeting exceptions apply only when relatively specific threats are discussed or
when government infrastructure and security protocol are analyzed. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 14, 2005,
No. 2005-40, § 7,2005 Ala. Acts 55, 61-62 (codified at ALA. CODE § 36-25A-7(a)(4) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2011)); Act of Mar. 27, 2003, Act 763, §§ 2-3, 2003 Ark. Acts 2487, 2489-91 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-19-105(b)(15), 25-19-106(c)(6)(A) (Supp. 2011)); Act Effective July 12,
2002, ch. 175, § 2, 2002 Cal. Stat. 816, 823-24 (codified at CAL. GOv'T CODE § 54956.5 (West
2010)); Act ofApr. 12, 2002, ch. 86, § 7, 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 236, 238 (codified at COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-6-402(3)(a)(IV) (2012)); Act ofjuly 3, 2002, ch. 354, § 1, 73 Del. Laws 997, 997-98
(codified at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29, § 10002()(17a)); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10004(b)(6);
Act of Mar. 4, 2002, ch. 62, § 1, 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 132, 132-33 (codified at IDAHO CODE
ANN. §9 9340B(4)(b) (Supp. 2012)); IDAH-O CODE ANN. § 67-2345(1)(d) (Supp. 2012); Act of
May 20, 2004, ch. 177, § 2, 2004 Kan. Sess. Laws 1805, 1811-12 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §
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exceptions follow a common post-September 11 practice of allowing executive ses-
sions, or dosed meetings, whenever a nonpublic or confidential record will be dis-
cussed.145 These statutes could be quite expansive in practice, because a similar
number of states also passed exceptions to their state open records laws for records
related to public safety threats, whether those threats are posed by terrorism or
some other type ofdisaster.14 ' Thus, many of these laws now allow closed meetings
75-4319(b)(13) (Supp. 2011)); Act of May 29, 2004, ch. 290, § 18, 2004 Minn. Laws 1482
(codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13D.05(3)(d) (West 2005)); Act of May 17, 2002, ch. 222, §§
222:2-:3, 2002 N.H. Laws 329, 330 (codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:3(II)(i), (III)
(Supp. 2012)); S.B. No. 395, ch. 175, § 1,2003 Okla. Sess. Laws 687, 687-89 (codified at OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tt. 25, § 307(B)(9) (West 2008)); H.B. 2425, ch. 524, § 4,2003 Or. Laws 1758,1765-
66 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 192.660(2)(f), (m) (2011)); Act of Feb. 14, 2008, No. 2008-3,
2008 Pa. Laws 6, 18-25 (codified at 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.708(b)(2) (West 2010)). Other states
appear to authorize broader exceptions to open meetings, even when officials only discuss, more
generally, public health and welfare or emergency response plans. See, e.g., Act ofJune 6, 2002, ch.
36, § 1, 2002 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 36, 1-2 (codified atALASKA STAT. § 40.25.120(a)(10) (2010));
ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310(c)(4) (2010); Act ofJune 13, 2002, Pub. Act No. 02-133, § 1, 2002
Conn. Acts 868, 868-72 (Reg Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-210(b)(19) (West
2007)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-200(6)(E); Act of Dec. 10, 2001, ch. 2001-361, § 2, 2002
Fla. Laws 31, 32 (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.0113(1) (West 2009)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
119.071(3)(a) (West 2008); Act ofjuly 1, 2009, ch. 28, § 18, 2009 Mass. Acts 557, 562 (codified at
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 21(a)(4) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)); Act of Mar. 29,2002, No. 130,
2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 389, 392 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 15.243(l)(y) (West 2004));
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.268(h); Act of Mar. 20, 2003, ch. 385, § 1, 2003 N.D. Laws
1343, 1343 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-24(1), (2) (2007)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-
04-19.2(1); Act ofMar. 20, 2002, Sub. S.B. No. 184, § 1,2002 Ohio Laws 1742, 1746-47 (codified
at OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 121.22(G)(6) (West Supp. 2012)).
145. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19.2(1) (2007) (authorizing a "governing body' to "hold an
executive session to consider or discuss dosed or confidential records").
146. Act of Mar. 15, 2005 § 4, 2005 Ala. Acts at 60-61 (codified at ALA. CODE § 36-25A-4 (2001));
Act of June 6, 2002 § 1, 2002 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 36 at 1-2 (codified at ALASKA STAT. §
40.25.120(a)(10) (2010)); Act of Mar. 27, 2003 § 2,2003 Ark. Acts at 2489-91 (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(b)(18) (West 2002)); Act ofApr. 12, 2002 § 9, 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws at
239 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(VIII)(A) (2012)); Act ofJune 13, 2002 § 1,
2002 Conn. Acts at 869-72 (Reg Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210(b)(19)(i), (iv)-
(viii) (2007)); Act ofJuly 3, 2002 § 1,2001 Del. Laws at 997-98 (codified at DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
29, § 10002(g)(17a) (West 2003)); Act of Dec. 10, 2001 § 2, 2002 Fla. Laws at 32 (codified at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 119.071(3)(a) (West 2008)); Act ofMar. 4,2002 § 1,2002 Idaho Sess. Laws at 132-
33 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-340B(4)(b) (West 2010)); Act ofApr. 22,2002, ch. 1117, §
53, 2002 Iowa Acts 234,234-35 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.7(45) (West 2010)); Act of
Apr. 12, 2006, ch. 1054, § 2, 2006 Iowa Acts 144, 144-45 (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. §
22.7(50) (West 2010)); S.B. 240, ch. 3, § 1, 2002 Md. Laws 23, 24-25 (codified at MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOVT § 10-618() (LexisNexis 2009)); Act of Sept. 5, 2002, ch. 313, § 1, 2002 Mass.
Acts 1055, 1055 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 4, § 7(26)(n) (LexisNexis 2011)); Act ofMay
1, 2002, No. 130, 2002 Mich. Pub. Acts 389, 392 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
15.243(l)(y) (West 2004)); Act ofMay 17,2002 § 222:4,2002 N.H. Laws at 330 (codified atN.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:5(VI) (West 2001)); S.B. 990, No. 2001-500, § 3.1, 2001 N.C. Sess.
Laws 3020, 3020-21 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.6 (2011)); Act of Mar. 20, 2003 § 1,
2003 N.D. Laws at 1343-44 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-24(1), (2) (2007)); H.B. 2425
§ 1, 2003 Or. Laws at 1758-60 (codified at OR. RENV. STAT. § 192.501(18), (23)); Act ofjune 4,
in virtually any imaginable disaster scenario because many security plans and emer-
gency response measures have been deemed nonpublic records. The public or press
also cannot later access those same records.' 47
The conflation ofwar, terrorism, and other disasters for purposes ofpublic in-
formation policy-a phenomenon accelerated and solidified by September 11-
obscures the important distinctions between thinking- and nonthinking-enemy
situations. Moreover, equating terrorism and nonthinking-enemy disasters in state
sunshine laws provides both political and legal cover for state decisionmakers who
are inclined to conceal disaster information from the public.' 48
B. Disaster as War: War Rhetoric and the Public Narrative of Disaster
The temptation to meld disaster and war has manifested itself, not only in the
expansion of wartime exceptionalism in state sunshine laws to nonthinking-enemy
2002, No. 339, § 17, 2002 S.C. Acts 3673 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(c) (2011)); Act
Effective Mar. 19, 2009, ch. 10, § 1, 2009 S.D. Sess. Laws 69, 71, 76 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 1-27-1.5(8),(9),(17),(23) (2004)); H.B. No. 9, ch. 1312, § 3, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 4809,
4813-15 (codified at TEx. GOVT CODE ANN. §§ 418.176-418.183 (West 2012)); Act ofjan. 31,
2008, ch. 3, § 199, 2008 Utah Laws 229, 232 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-305(48)
(LexisNexis 2011)); H. 457, Pub. Act No. 63, sec. 29, § 317(c), 2003 Vt. Acts & Resolves 280
(codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(c)(32) (LexisNexis 2010)); Act ofApr. 12, 2004, ch. 690,
2004 Va. Act 997, 998 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705.2(2)-(4) (2011)); H.B. 3009, ch.
108, § 1, 2003 W. Va. Acts 983, 985-86 (codified at W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4(a)(9)-(16)
(LexisNexis 2012)).
147. Some states did pass terrorism-specific open-meeting exceptions. See, e.g., Act ofMar. 20,2006, Pub.
L. No. 101-2006, § 3, 2006 Ind. Acts 1844, 1846-47 (codified at IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1.5-
6.1(b)(13) (LexisNexis 2006)); Act ofJune 7, 2004, § A, 2004 Mo. Legis. Serv. 869 (West) (codified
at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.021(18) (West 2006)). In addition, some states passed terrorism-specific
open-records exceptions. See, e.g., S.B. 1167, ch. 118, § 1, 2003 Ariz. Sess. Laws 455 (codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-126 (2011)); Act ofApr. 8,2003, ch. 288, § 1, 2003 N.M. Laws 2649,
2649-50 (codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-1(A)(7) (LexisNexis 2003)).
148. Of course, many of the executives-such as governors and mayors-who are charged with making
decisions during disasters are not constrained by open-meetings laws in the first instance because indi-
vidual decisionmakers (as opposed to public decisionmaking bodies such as agencies) are typically not
covered by sunshine laws. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOVT § 10-502(h)(3)(i) (LexisNexis
2009) (excluding from the definition of "public body' "any single member entity"); id. § 10-505 (re-
quiring that "a public body shall meet in open session"). Nonetheless, the states open meetings laws
provide an important background legal framework that is likely to influence official views about the
propriety and desirability of public disclosure ofpotentiallyworrisome disaster data. Another potential
limitation on the reach of these new sunshine law exceptions is that many state open-meeting laws
prohibit state agencies from taking final action during the dosed executive sessions authorized by the
statute. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 21.5(3) (West 2010) (requiring that "[flinal action by any
governmental body on any matter shall be taken in an open session"). However, some states do not
include such a prohibition, see, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15(a) (West 2002) (allowing actions taken
in closed meetings to be valid unless challenged in court within forty-five days after the action has been
made public), and-in any event-agencies are generally frce to do all of their deliberations during the
closed sessions and then to simply announce their binding decision, without further discussion, in a
subsequent open meeting.
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disasters, but also in the framing of the public narrative of those disasters. Indeed,
war rhetoric today plays an increasingly prominent role in the narrative ofboth nat-
ural and technological disaster response."
The connection between natural disaster and war is not new. Federal disas-
ter management in the United States had its roots in civil defense,15 0 and early
federal disaster programs were the purview of defense-related organizations such
as the Office of Civil Defense of the Department of Defense."s' Moreover, the
earliest disaster sociological research was funded by the federal government dur-
ing the Cold War-when the threat of nuclear attack weighed heavily on the
American psyche-in the hope that understanding public response to natural
disasters could yield important insights for understanding potential civilian re-
sponse to nuclear attack.152  Over time, however, this initial impetus seems to
have been turned on its head: Rather than looking to natural disasters to under-
stand and frame how citizens might react to a war emergency, such as nuclear at-
tack, both the press and policymakers have begun drawing on war rhetoric to
understand and frame natural disasters.153
When Hurricane Katrina struck on August 29, 2005, just four short years
after the September 11 attacks and two and a half years after the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA) was engulfed in the sprawling national se-
149. A few scholars, most of them outside of the law, have noted the expansion of war rhetoric into a
particular disaster realm. See, e.g., ANNAS, supra note 92, at 219 (public health emergencies); Leslie
E. Gerwin, Planninz for Pandemic A New Model for Governing Public Health Emergencies, 37 AM.
J.L. &MED. 128, 138 (2011) (public health emergencies); Timothy Ingalsbee, The War on Wildfire.
Firflghting and the Militarization of Forest Fire Management, in THE WILDFIRE READER: A
CENTURY OF FAILED FOREST POLICY 262, 262 (George Wuerthner ed., 2006) (wildfire);
Kathleen Tierney & Christine Beve, Disaster as War: Militarism and the Social Construction ofDisaster
in New Orleans, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES ON A MODERN
CATASTROPHE 35, 35-36 (David L. Brunsma et al. eds., 2007) (describing framing of Hurricane
Katrina as war). This Article, however, is the first to make a comprehensive assessment of the role of
war rhetoric in the public narrative of a wide array of natural and technological disasters, as well as its
implications for disaster information flow.
150. Tiemey & Bevc, supra note 149, at 35-36 ("Present-day institutions and policies related to disaster
management were originally rooted in Cold War civil protection challenges, especially those
associated with the threat of a nuclear attack."). In some respects, disaster management as a field did
not make a complete break from civil defense until the 1990s. See id at 36.
151. See id.
152. See Kathleen Tiemey et al., Metaphors Matter. Disaster Myths, Media Frames, and Their Consequences
in Hurricane Katrina, 604 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 57-58 (2006); Lisa Grow
Sun, Disaster Mythology andthe Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131,1137 (2011).
153. For detailed discussions of the use ofwar rhetoric after Hurricane Katrina, see Tierney & Bevc, supra
note 149, and Tiemey et a supra note 152. The evidence of Katrina "war zone" rhetoric presented
in this Part also draws on evidence compiled by one of the Article's coauthors in an earlier article
addressing the effects of the disaster myth of looting and violence on U.S. disaster law and policy. See
Sun, supra note 152, at 1133, 1141.
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curity bureaucracy of the new Department of Homeland Security,154 war rhetoric
quickly emerged as a powerful driver of both public perception of the disaster and
official decisionmaking.'s Indeed, war was one ofthe most consistently employed
narratives ofpost-Katrina New Orleans.1 6
The war described by officials and the media was not a war against nature, as one
might expect, but a war waged by Katrina's victims against their would-be rescuers
and fellow survivors.s' This war rhetoric was built on official and media reports of
widespread chaos, anarchy, and violent crime directed at both rescuers and other
survivors in post-Katrina New Orleans, reports that turned out to be either greatly
exaggerated or, in some cases, completely false.' 5 Early in the coverage of Katri-
na, reports began "characteriz[ing] the events in New Orleans as the equivalent of
war-and, more specifically, the urban insurgency the U.S. military [] face[d] in
Iraq [at the time].1 59 The lead news storyin the Los Angeles Times reported National
Guard troops taking "positions on rooftops, scanning for snipers and armed mobs as
seething crowds of refugees milled below, desperate to flee" while "[g]unfire crack-
led in the distance."160 In a similar vein, the title of one prominent article in the
Washington Post proclaimed: "Troops Back From Iraq Find Another War Zone;
In New Orleans, 'It's Like Baghdad on a Bad Day."""' The article went on to re-
port that "just the smell and feel of a war zone in the city put the soldiers on
edge."162 Describing the National Guard's deployment in New Orleans, CNN's
Wolf Blitzer reported that "eight convoys and troops are on the ground at last in a
place being described as a lawless, deadly war zone."' ABC News Online report-
ed shootings outside the Superdome and declared New Orleans a "war zone. "164
154. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) became part ofDHS on March 1, 2003.
155. See Tierney & Bevc, supra note 149, at 41.
156. Id.; see also Tiemey et al., supra note 152, at 57-58.
157. See id.; Sun, supra note 152, at 1133. General Russell Honor6, commander of the federal military
response in Katrina, also pronounced the hurricane itself "an enemy that pulled a 'classic military
maneuver,' speeding toward land with overwhelming force" and destroying infrastructure. Tierney
& Bevc, supra note 149, at 44 (citation omitted). "Thus, nature itself was recast as an 'intelligent
enemy like al-Qaeda bent on exploiting weaknesses in the nation's defenses." Id.
158. See generally Tierney & Bevc, supra note 149; Sun, supra note 152.
159. Tiemey &Bevc, supra note 149, at 41.
160. Ellen Barry et al., New Orleans Slides Into Chaos; U.S. Scrambles to Send Troops, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2005, at Al.
161. Ann Scott Tyson, Troops Back From Iraq FindAnother War Zone;-In New Orleans, 2t's Like Baghdad
on aBadDay,'WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A10.
162. Id
163. Jaime Omar Yassin, Demonizing the Victims of Katrina, EXTRA, Nov.-Dec. 2005, http://www.
fair.org/index.php?page=2793 (remarks of Wolf Blitzer).
164. Troops Told 'Shoot to Kill in Newo Orleans, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2005, 4:25 PM),
httpi/www.abc.netau/news/2005-09-02/troops-told-shoot-to-kill-in-new-orleans/2094678
[hereinafter Shoot to Kill].
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War rhetoric not only infused media reporting about Katrina but also
shaped public officials' characterization of the disaster and the appropriate-that
is, military-response. Shortly after Katrina made landfall, FEMA Director
Michael Brown advised President George W. Bush to invoke the Insurrection
Act, which would allow the president to federalize the National Guard and in-
vest law enforcement authority in both federalized national guard troops and ac-
tive-duty federal military, because reports of "shootings and looting" suggested
that the security situation in New Orleans was "spiraling out of control" and
Brown wanted "active-duty troops that are ready, willing and able to kill in that
area. 165  Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco likewise lauded the combat
training of the National Guard troops deployed to post-Katrina New Orleans,
noting that their skills would be put to good use in the "battle" for New Orleans'
chaotic streets:
These troops are fresh back from Iraq, well trained, experienced, bat-
tle-tested and under my orders to restore order in the streets. They
have M-16s and they are locked and loaded. These troops know how
to shoot and kill and they are more than willing to do so if necessary
and I expect they will.166
Katrina war rhetoric continued to influence policy debates about appropri-
ate emergency powers for natural disasters long after the floodwaters had subsid-
ed and many newspapers had retracted their early Katrina reporting, admitting
that reports of violence by Katrina survivors and shooting at would-be rescuers
were greatly exaggerated.' 6' Two weeks after the hurricane, President Bush ar-
gued that Katrina vividly illustrated the need for "a broader role for the armed
forces" in responding to natural catastrophes on the scale of Katrina.168 Like-
wise, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John
Warner, urged Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to "conduct a thorough re-
view of the entire legal framework governing a President's power to use the
regular armed forces to restore public order in . . . situations involving a large-
scale, protracted emergency like [Katrina] ."169
165. S. REP. No. 109-322, at 515 (2006) (quoting Interview with Michael Brown, Former Director,
FEMA (Feb. 23, 2006)).
166. Shoot to Kill, supra note 164.
167. See sources cited supra note 158.
168. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Hurricane Katrina Recovery From New
Orleans, Louisiana (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2005/09/20050915-8.html.
169. Letter From Senator John Warner to Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def. (Sept. 14, 2005) (on file
with author).
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This rhetoric culminated in October 2006 in a successful call to amend the
Insurrection Act to clarify (or arguably expand) the president's ability to use the
military to quell public disorder after natural disasters.170 The amendments con-
ferred power on the president to invest federal military with law enforcement
powers to respond to "domestic violence" that results from a "natural disaster, ep-
idemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident. "171
Katrina is not the only natural disaster realm in which the rhetoric of war
and national security has made significant inroads in shaping the public narrative
of disaster. War rhetoric has also been gaining momentum in the planning for
public health emergencies such as pandemics. As with disasters more generally,
the rhetorical connection between public health and war is not entirely new.
Scholars and commentators have, for some time, both noted and criticized the
use of war rhetoric (such as Nixon's "War on Cancer") in medicine, in general, 172
and public health, in particular. 173
The events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks later that same year ac-
celerated the evolution of a "new paradigm" identifying infectious disease out-
breaks not merely as public health challenges, but as critical national security
threats.1'4 While this paradigm shift has been driven largely by the federal gov-
ernment's heavy emphasis on preparing the country for bioterrorism,175 naturally
occurring disease outbreaks are increasingly viewed through this same national
security lens. The current White House website page for Homeland Security, for
example, proclaims the expansion of national security threats to include "high-
consequence, nontraditional threats," including naturally occurring pandemic
disease: "Attacks using improvised nuclear devices or biological weapons, as
170. See Sun, supra note 152, at 1163. The Insurrection Act amendments were promptly repealed
because of opposition from state governors to expanded federal control of state National Guard
units. See id.
171. Id. atl1165.
172. See, e.g., Ann Mongoven, The War on Disease and the War on Terror: A Dangerous Metaphorical
Nexus?, 15 CAMBRIDGE QHEALTHCARE ETHICS 403,409 (2006).
173. See id. at 404, 407 (summarizing dangers of framing medicine "as a war against disease'-particularly
as the kind of "total, holy war against a demonic enemy"-induding the "implicit[] defin[ition of]
patients as enemies and their bodies as battlefields").
174. GARY CECCHINE &MELINDA MOORE, NATL DEF. RESEARCHINST., INFECTIOUS DISEASE
AND NATIONAL SECURITY: STRATEGIC INFORMATION NEEDS 30 (2006) (explaining that "a
new paradigm linking infectious disease to national security was already evolving during the 1990s,
and it became more of a priority after the terror events of September and October 2001" and
concluding that "[r]ecent U.S. policy initiatives dearly recognize the relationship between infectious
disease-both deliberate and naturally occurring threats-and national security, and seek to
operationalize responses to these new threats").
175. ANNAS, supra note 92, at 211.
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well as outbreaks of a pandemic disease, pose a serious and increasing national se-
curity risk." 76
The rhetoric of militarism and war has, not surprisingly, been part and par-
cel of both official and media descriptions of this new national security threat.1 77
The post-September 11 national security model of pandemic response imagines
the need for aggressive, highly coercive measures such as mandatory quarantine
and vaccination enforced against citizens not only by local police, who are likely
to be quickly overwhelmed by the task, but by the military.178 Thus, in October
2005, President Bush called on Congress to give the executive authority to use
the U.S. military to enforce quarantines in American communities experiencing
bird flu outbreaks.17 ' Despite the relatively limited effects of both avian and swine
flu in the United States,18 o the press reported both a "war on bird flu"181 and a sub-
sequent "war on swine flu."182 The 2007 bird flu simulation exercises sponsored by
176. Homeland Secuity, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.witehouse.gov/issues/homeland-security (last visit-
ed Mar. 11, 2013).
177. One could imagine, of course, a national security framework in which at least some threats could be
analyzed outside of the context of war and military mobilization, but as the war on terror dem-
onstrates, national security and war are currently deeply entwined. Alternatively, security could also
be reconceptualized as a broader concept, which extends beyond third-party threats to physical safe-
ty. See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cu61lar, "Securing" the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the
Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 596 (2009) (describing the "flexible"
notion of security promoted by the Roosevelt administration and embodied in the expansive
mandate of the Federal Security Agency, which "blur[red] the distinctions between social services,
economic security, health regulation, and geostrategic national security"); f WORLD HEALTH
ORG., A SAFER FuTURE: GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH SECURITY IN THE 21sT CENTURY (2007)
(suggesting adoption of a "public health security" framework, which appears to be a self-conscious
attempt to reshape the idea of security by focusing on human thriving).
178. ANNAS, supra note 92, at 219 ("It is a destructive and counterproductive post-9/11 myth that
countering a pandemic requires public health officials to revert to pre-World War I tactics of forced
quarantine and mandatory physical examinations and vaccinations. Just as many national leaders
argued that the public must barter its civil liberties for safety from terrorist attacks, so public health
officials have argued that health is best protected by adopting the national security metaphor. 2001 is
the excuse, but 1918 is the model.").
179. Bush Pushes for Military to Quarantine Avian Flu Breakout, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 5, 2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,171230,00.html.
180. See, e.g., H5N1 Avian Flu (H5N1 Bird Flu), FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/abouttheflu/
h5nl/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (noting that "there have be no reported [H5N1
infections] in birds, poultry, or people in the United States"); Richard Knox, Flu Pandemic Much
Milder Than Expected, NPR.ORG (Dec. 8, 2009, 12:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=121184706 (quantifying ways in which the swine flu pandemic in the United
States was "much milder" than expected).
181. See, e.g., Donald G. McNeil,Jr., In War on Bird Flu, UN Looks to Recruit KillerArmy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2006, at A4.
182. See, e.g., Elizabeth Landau, At CDC, War Against Flu Doesn't Stop, CNN (May 2, 2009),
httpi/articles.cnn.com/2009-05-02/healthswine.flu.inside.cdc 1 vaccine-for-swine-flu-cdc-s-
inf luenza-division-hint (discussing "war" against swine f lu).
the Center for Disease Control were designed by a "retired general who spent 34
years running war games for the Pentagon"8 3 and hailed by the press as "war
games." 84
Wildfires are another type of natural disaster for which war rhetoric is
commonly employed. Firefighters "battle" individual fires185 and wage "war on
wildfire,,"186 more generally. As one critic has noted, "the discourse of [wildland]
fire management is thoroughly tainted with war metaphors[] [f]rom terms such
as 'initial attack' to the foundational concept of 'firefighting.""" During the 2012
summer wildfire season that ravaged many western states, Tom Harbour, Direc-
tor of Fire and Aviation Management at the U.S. Forest Service, explained that,
at least "in a sense," "fire is war."188 News reports of the summer fires described
local incident commanders "[h]oled up in makeshift war rooms . . . spend[ing]
nearly every waking hour ... trying to plot their next move."189
Moreover, war rhetoric has also spread beyond natural disasters to techno-
logical disasters and accidents. Indeed, war rhetoric permeated the official re-
sponse to the BP oil spill. President Obama declared the spill "an assault on our
shores," and pledged to "fight back with everything that we've got."190 The Presi-
dent also repeatedly invoked battle imagery to describe the spill response,' 9' and
183. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., In aDaylong Dril4 anAgency Triesto Ieparefor a Real Outbreak fAvian Flu,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007, at A14. War rhetoric was also a common feature of UK news reporting
of the avian flu threat. See Nelya Koteyko et al., The Dead Parrot and the Dying Swan The Role f
Metaphor Scenarios in UK Press Coverage ofAvian Flu in the UK in 2005-2006,23 METAPHOR &
SYMBOL 242, 247 (2008) (describing how, as the threat of avian flu became more serious in Europe,
experts and the U.K. media used '"war' metaphors" to characterize the diseases advance).
184. See, e.g., David Brown, In Dril4 CDC Practicesforlnjluenza Pandemic, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/03/AR2007020301120.html.
185. See, e.g., Ingalsbee, supra note 149, at267.
186. See, e.g., id. at 262.
187. Id. at 281 (arguing for the creation of a "new narrative" of fire management, free of war metaphors);
see also id. at 262 ('The federal government conducts wildland fire suppression through a militaristic
paradigm-as fire 'fighting' in a'war on wildfire."').
188. John Miller & Susan Montoya Bryan, 'War Room' Type Effort Places Firef/ghting Assets, YAHOO!
NEWS (June 29, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/war-room-type-effort-places-firefighting-assets-
081359002.htnl.
189. Id.
190. President Barack Obama, Remarks at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Pensacola, Fla. (June
15, 2010).
191. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks Honoring the 2010 Super Bowl Champion New
Orleans Saints (Aug. 9, 2010) ("But what is dear is that the battle to stop the oil from flowing into
the Gulf is just about over."); Obama, supra note 190 ("[W]e're now battling the worst economic-
environmental disaster in American history."); President Barack Obama, Remarks at Carnegie
Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pa. (June 2, 2010) ("[W]e're waging this baffle [against the oil spill]
every minute of every day.").
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described his proposed response as "our battle plan ... going forward."' 92 U.S.
Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, the National Incident Commander for the
federal BP spill response, described the growing spill as "a war, . . . an insidious
war, because it's attacking. . . four states one at a time, and it comes from differ-
ent directions depending on the weather."' 93 State and local officials also declared
war on the spill. Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal announced, 'We are abso-
lutely in a war to protect our way of life."194 Likewise, Plaquemines Parish Presi-
dent Billy Nungesser described the spill response as a "war."195
The official response to the spill was also punctuated by the invocation of
violent, affect-rich' 96 language, such as President Obama's announcement that he
was determining "whose ass to kick"'197 and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar's asser-
tion that the Obama administration's 'Job" was "to keep the boot on the neck of
British Petroleum."'9 8 Secretary Salazar also twice "used the imagery of a Wild
West bar fight to describe how the administration was dealing with" BP.199
IV. WAR, DISASTERS, AND SECRECY
The legal and rhetorical melding ofwar and disaster described in Part III pre-
sents real, concrete risks to government openness and press access during disasters,
and thus to effective and appropriate disaster planning and response. The rhetoric
ofwar frames public discourse about appropriate disaster management and justifies
measures like information withholding that would otherwise dearly appear trou-
bling.200 The statutory extension of wartime transparency exceptionalism to cover
192. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on the Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico (June
15,2010).
193. Jack Date, National Incident Commander on BP Oil Spill:' "It's an Insidious War," ABC NEWS
(June 6, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/TisWeek/national-inddent-commander-bp-oil-spill-insidious-
war/storyid=10840145. Allen also invoked the language of terrorism to describe the spill, noting that
"[t]his spill is keeping everybody hostage." CARL SAFINA, A SEA IN FLAMES: THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL BLOwoUT 126 (2011).
194. Press Release, Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
Governor Jindal: We Are in a War Against This Oil, Need Real Results (June 16, 2010),
http://emergency.ouisiana.gov/Releases/06162010-governor.html.
195. Harry R. Weber, AP Enterprise: Spill Bound BP, Feds Together, SpillAllied Feds andBP TOPEKA
CAP.J., Aug. 22, 2010, at 10.
196. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61,
66(2002).
197. Weber, supra note 195.




200. For a general discussion of the ways that metaphors can create new "social realities," "guide .. . fuiture
action," and justify "policy change and political and economic action," see GEORGE LAKOFF &
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nonthinking-enemy disasters, in turn, provides legal cover for the lack of transpar-
ency that the war framing both suggests and legitimizes.
Of course, not all war melding and war rhetoric is created equal in terms of
the harm it may generate. Conceptualizing disaster as war is in some respects less
problematic than conceptualizing counterterrorism as war. In contrast to the war
on terror, most disasters (whether pandemics, hurricanes, or earthquakes) will
come to an end, as will their immediate consequences, so--absent a prolonged
sequence of truly catastrophic events-the disaster-as-war is unlikely to devolve
into a never-ending conflict against a vague and shifting threat. Moreover, disas-
ter wars are considerably less likely than the war on terror to open the door to "real
wars"201 of the traditional kind.
Nevertheless, the disaster-as-war paradigm2 02 has important real-world
consequences that should not be ignored. As essayist Susan Sontag argued, war
metaphors may be particularly dangerous when society is less likely to recognize
that war is, indeed, just a metaphor-an incomplete representation of reality, and
one with "powerful consequences.1"203 As with the war on terror, the heavy in-
volvement of the military in much disaster response204 and the historic pedigree
of disasters as potential "states of exception,"205 outside of the normal legal struc-
ture, create a serious risk that policymakers, and even the public, will forget-at
least for truly catastrophic disasters-that war is merely metaphorical.
MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 156 (2d ed. 2003). See also Koteyko et al., supra note
183, at 244 (arguing that "[d]iscourse metaphors frame and organize our shared narratives of
politics," are "embedded in discursive formations and networks of power," are "constitutive of certain
views of the world, of society, and how things work," and "can have important implications for how
policies are formulated as apparently natural and sensible responses to the issue in question"); id. at
258 (noting that "[m]etaphors construct, or frame views of reality, which can be used in policy
making and planning" (citation omitted)).
201. BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE
OF TERRORISM 15 (2006) (arguing that the war on terror "makes it easier for the president to fight
real wars against real countries").
202. SeeTiemey&Bevc, supra note 149.
203. See Susan Sontag, RealBattles andEmpty Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 10,2002, atA25.
204. The relationship between war rhetoric and the role of the military in disaster response is, no doubt, a
complicated one. Over time, war rhetoric may increase the military's involvement in disaster re-
sponse, as enlisting the military will seem the obvious and natural choice when confronting a disaster
framed as a war, and the increased visibility of the military during disasters may then, in turn, fuel dis-
aster war rhetoric and confirm the plausibility of the military metaphor. Nonetheless, conceiving of
disasters as war is not the only (or even, perhaps, the most important) driver of the militarys expansive
role in disaster response. The military's capacity to rapidly mobilize and deploy the requisite manpower
and equipment for disaster response on short notice-and the absence of any comparable civilian
institution-explains much of the country's current reliance on the military in times ofdisaster.
205. See, e.g., KRISTIAN CEDERVALL LAUTA, EXCEPIONS AND NORMS: THE LAW ON NATURAL
DISASTERS 63-94 (2012) (situating natural disasters in the historical tradition of "states of
exception").
Moreover, for purposes of information policy, in particular, the melding of
war and disaster is even more troubling than the melding of war and terrorism,
because while the thinking-enemy rationale for war transparency exceptionalism
has at least some currency in the context of terror, it has no application to natural
or technological disasters. Beyond the "reflexive secrecy" that war rhetoric may
spawn,206 the bleed of war rhetoric into disasters may encourage the construction
of enemies from whom information can justifiably be withheld, the transfor-
mation of public spaces into war zones from which interested citizens and press
can be more easily excluded, and the reliance on notions of the "fog of war" to jus-
tify communication failures and overbroad restrictions on access to affected lo-
cales. Each of these phenomena exacerbates and gives heightened expression to
temptations toward secrecy and restricting information and access that already
exist during disasters.
Indeed, war framing aside, there is a wide spectrum of potential govern-
mental motivations for withholding or distorting information or otherwise im-
peding public access to disaster information. On one end of the spectrum are
particularly malicious motivations that are driven by self-interest rather than any
notion of the public good. Such motivations might include face-saving efforts
(including attempts to cover up or minimize the extent of a disaster), blame-
deflection impulses, power grabs (perhaps justified by exaggerating a disaster's
scope), attempts to minimize liability risk to the government or private tortfea-
sors, other political aims, and general public-relations or image-enhancement
goals. On the other end of the spectrum are more benevolent motivations for
information failures-motivations rooted in an impulse, however misguided, to
serve the public good and ensure greater public safety. Such motivations might
include fear that providing information prematurely to the public will cause con-
fusion or chaos, fear that fill information about the risks at hand might cause
people to panic (and, for example, engage in irrational or unsafe flight from the
area or unnecessary and risky counterhealth measures), or fear of "warning fa-
tigue" (caused by public perception that officials have repeatedly "cried wolf'
when warning about impending disasters). 207
In the middle of these two extremes are some arguably neutral governmen-
tal motivations-neither malicious nor benevolent-that nevertheless produce
the failed information-flow outcomes. Most of these involve governments that
neither selfishly served their own political or public relations purposes nor acted
206. Mongoven, supra note 172, at 411 (noting that "war mentalities can generate reflexive secrecy" but
that Singapore reacted to SARS by publicizing cases rather than suppressing them, as China did).
207. See discussion infra PartlIV.A.1.
923Disaggregating Disasters
out of particular concern for the public, but instead simply lacked the communi-
cative competencies to offer a useful and accurate flow of disaster information.
Among these explanations are disorganization, lack of planning and prepared-
ness, and the communication of less-than-useful information, often because it is
provided in a format that is difficult for ordinary citizens to decipher.
It may well be the case that, in any given instance, it is impossible to con-
cretely determine which of these motivations are driving a failure of government
transparency-and it is probable that the more benevolent justifications might be
invoked as pretext for decisions made more maliciously. But the larger point re-
mains: Government, both at its best and at its worst, finds itself with the tempta-
tion to restrict information flow at times of disaster.
A. War Enemies
The prevalence of war rhetoric in disasters may exacerbate many of these
already-existing temptations toward secrecy during disasters by building on
preexisting fears about public reaction to disasters to identify the public (or seg-
ments of the public) as "enemies" from whom information can reasonably be
withheld for the greater good. Every war requires an enemy, and disasters-as-
war are no exception. Indeed, Schmittian notions of the state of exception are
undergirded by the friend/foe distinction. 08 Thus, the expansion of war rhetoric
into nonwar disasters spurs and perpetuates the hunt for enemies and justifies en-
emy construction when dear enemies are otherwise lacking. Those constructed
enemies may then stand in for the thinking enemy of war and terrorism, suggest-
ing that disasters are thinking-enemy situations like war and terrorism that may
justify withholding disaster information from the public (or even distorting that
information) to prevent its exploitation by the enemy.209
Subpart A.1 identifies likely candidates for enemy construction during dis-
asters. Potential candidates for illegitimate enemy construction include (1) the
208. See CARL SCHMITTgTHE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 39 (George Schwab trans., Chicago Press
2007) (1932) ("[I]n the orientation toward the possible extreme case of an actual battle against a real
enemy, the political entity is essential, and it is the decisive entity for the friend-or-enemy grouping;
and in this (and not in any kind of absolutist sense), it is sovereign.").
209. There is, of course, a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem with war rhetoric and enemy construction:
Does disaster-war rhetoric cause enemy construction or does society employ war rhetoric because
enemies have already been identified? The relationship between war rhetoric and enemy con-
struction is probably best viewed as a mutually reinforcing cycle, in which war rhetoric encourages the
hunt for enemies and the identification of enemies, in turn, entrenches the rhetoric ofwar. There are,
of course, also a myriad of reasons for enemy construction (many of which parallel the self interested
motivations for secrecy) that are not about secrecy per se, including, for example, blaming victims and
justifing power grabs.
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"panicking public" at large; (2) the "worried well" and other arguable bystanders
who consume resources needed by those who are more at risk; (3) the "overly
complacent" who are disinclined to comply with government orders to, for exam-
ple, evacuate; (4) "dissenters" or "impeders" who disagree with the government's
chosen response or who might otherwise get in the way of that response; and (5)
the allegedly "lawless" who go beyond mere noncompliance to outright law viola-
tion and even violence.210
As Subpart A.2 below demonstrates, this kind of enemy construction to jus-
tify information withholding is troubling for a wide array of reasons. First, these
potential enemies lack the characteristics of the thinking enemies of war and ter-
ror and should not be equated with thinking enemies for purposes of information
policy. Second, much of this enemy construction builds on fears about typical
human reaction to disaster that are largely unfounded and grounded in myth ra-
ther than empirical evidence. Third, even to the extent that the governmental
fears are warranted, withholding information is likely to be counterproductive,
subverting the very goals the government purportedly seeks to achieve. Fourth,
enemy construction risks becoming a vicious cycle in which the existence of ene-
mies justifies government information control and the government then uses that
measure of information control to frither vilifr and construct enemies. Finally,
210. Of course, framing war as disaster may encourage and legitimate construction of many different
enemies-including such obvious candidates as nature, see, e.g., Ingalsbee, supra note 149, at 281
(arguing that "although we call itfireflighting, we are not really fighting fires; we are fightingforest and
that "[w]e are not making war on wildfire; we are making war on wildland?'); id. at 263 (noting that
"each successfilly contained and controlled fire offers only a fleeting victory over an 'enemy' that re-
turns year after year with escalating power and fury'), the hazard itself (e.g., oil), see supra notes 190-
195 and accompanying text, and, during at least some disasters, the tortfeasors responsible for the
harm, see sup-a notes 197-199 and accompanying text (detailing the Obama administration's
identification of BP as the enemy). Construction of these types of enemies is likely to be
problematic for a number of reasons. For example, treating disasters as a war against nature may
obscure the human contribution to disasters and may encourage society to focus on disaster mitigation
measures that attempt to control or subjugate nature rather than those measures that respect natural
forces and try to limit population growth in the most dangerous locales. Cf Ingalsbee, supra note 149,
at 263-64 (arguing that "[w]ildland firefighting strikes a resonant chord in the American people
because it epitomizes the Western Enlightenmenfs crusade to control and exploit nature and it
continually reenacts the uniquely American experience of conquering the western frontier and all the
wild forces of nature" and that the "warfare on wildfire" prevents the American public from embracing
"[a] vision of human communities that can live safely and sustainably with wildland fire"). However,
the implications for government openness are not as immediately apparent unless the tortfeasor can
reasonably be accused of purposefully trying to inflict further harm and could exploit information
about the disaster to increase that harm. However, this kind of enemy construction, too, is likely to
bleed into the construction of enemies that are more clearly troubling from the perspective of sound
disaster information policy. Additionally, while this Article focuses on the categories of constructed
enemies enumerated in the text, there are likely other potential candidates for enemy construction who
might indirectly, but not intentionally, cause others harm, such as those who have becn exposed or
infected during a pandemic. See ANNAS, supra note 92, at 214-15.
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the segments of the population most likely to be singled out as "enemies are
poor, minority communities and individuals.
1. Potential Candidates for Enemy Construction
a. The "Panicking Public"
An obvious candidate for enemy construction during disasters is what might
be called the "panicking public." One of the most common (or at least most
commonly articulated)211 government motivations for secrecy and delay of infor-
mation dissemination during disasters is based on official fears that full, immedi-
ate information will cause the public to panic-to react in overzealous, frenzied,
or unruly ways that themselves can cause significant harm 2  Panic might in-
clude, for example, irrational or unsafe flight from an area or unnecessary and
risky counterhealth measures (like dosing with iodine to stave off nonexistent or
very low radiation risks).213
Examples of governments withholding information or otherwise downplay-
ing disaster risks to avoid public panic abound in both natural and technological
disasters.24 Government disaster communication to the public often takes the
form of evacuation orders, which reflect an official judgment about the levels of
risk facing different segments of the population, as well as about the effectiveness
of evacuation in mitigating that risk. Disaster sociologists have repeatedly ob-
served that officials sometimes delay calls for evacuation because they fear that an
evacuation order will cause people to panic.215
211. It maybe the case, of course, that officials withholding information cite panic as a public justification
for their actions in order to disguise their true, more malicious intention (such as face saving). Simi-
larly, constructing the "panicking public" as a disaster wartime enemy may allow officials to disguise
their true self-interested motivations.
212. See infra notes 248-252 and sources cited therein (discussing the meaning ofpanic).
213. Seecid.
214. HENRY W. FSCHER, III, RESPONSE TO DISASTER: FACT VERSUS FICTION AND ITS
PERPETUATION: THE SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTER 120 (3d ed. 2008) (recounting sociological study
finding that "[i]nformation about danger which should be disseminated to the public to facilitate their
evacuation is often withheld 'because of a fear that people will panic"' (citation omitted)). The 1918 flu
pandemic is one of the most notorious historical examples of information suppression during disasters
to control panic. See JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA: THE EPIC STORY OF THE
DEADLIEST PLAGUE IN HISTORY 336-39 (2004) (detailing press acquiescence in government
downplaying of flu risk and the severity of the pandemic to avoid panic).
215. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 214, at 50 ("Evacuations are sometimes delayed, until it is deemed
absolutely necessary, because officials do not want to cause an unnecessary panic."); Joseph Scanlon,
Unwuelcome Irritant or Usq Ally?: The Mass Media in Emergencies, in HANDBOOK OF DISASITER
RESEARCH 413, 416 (Havidin Rodrfguez et al. eds., 2007) (suggesting that one common
misconception about disasters is that "offlicials must be carefuil about issuing warnings because of the
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Similarly, state requests for a presidential declaration of emergency or disas-
ter serve not only to trigger the legal framework for federal disaster response but
also to communicate to the public the scope and seriousness of the disaster and its
resulting harm. During the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear incident, the state
of Pennsylvania reportedly delayed requesting a federal disaster declaration be-
cause of federal fears that the declaration would signal the seriousness of the crisis
and create panic. According to a Pennsylvania state official, one of President
Carter's advisors initially recommended that Pennsylvania Governor Richard
Thornburgh refrain from asking for a presidential disaster declaration for the
TMI incident because "the mere statement that the President has declared this
area an emergency and disaster area would trigger a substantial panic."216 Indeed,
the public risk communication model for the TMI disaster was apparently based
on the principle that it is "much harder to 'unscare' people than to scare them."217
More recently, in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami
in Japan, the Japanese government initially withheld from the public govern-
ment-generated predictions about the likely path of the fallout plume.218 Goshi
Hosono, the minister leading the response, explained that the Japanese leader-
ship was reluctant to share the information because they were "afraid of triggering
a panic."
b. The"Worried Well"
Another disaster-as-war enemy the government might identify during an
emergency is the overreacting citizen who hoards or consumes disaster response
resources, at the expense of those who are more directly and immediately at risk
danger of panic'); John H. Sorensen & Dennis S. Mileti, Decision-Making Uncertainties in Emergency
Warning System Organizations, 5 INILJ.MASS EMERGENCIES &DISASTERS 33,51 (1987) (noting
that "[w]arning decisions can be influenced by a decision-make? s perception of adverse public
consequences of ordering an evacuation" and that "[t]ypical concerns" include fear "that people will
panic and be hurt or killed").
216. JOHN G. KEMENY ET AL., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT
ATTHREE MILE ISLAND 124 (1979).
217. Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplfication of Risk- A Conceptual Framework, 8 RISK
ANALYSIS 177,184 (1988).
218. Norimitsu Onishi & Martin Fadder, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in Peril, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, at Al.
219. Osnos, supra note 91, at 59; see also Onishi & Fackler, supra note 218 ("Mr. Hosono, the minister
charged with dealing with the nuclear crisis, has said that certain information, including the Speedi
data, had been withheld for fear of 'creating a panic."'). Of course, there were likely other
government motivations for the information withholding at play as well. See id (describing other
possible reasons for withholding, including the governmentfs desire to limit expensive and difficult
evacuations).
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during the disaster. Indeed, one of the stronger rationales for allowing govern-
ment to withhold risk information-or even to affirmatively manipulate infor-
mation about risk levels to different population segments-is the fear that people
who are at lower risk will consume response resources needed by those who are
most at risk. In the public health context, for example, emergency planners often
refer to the "worried well,"220 who might hoard supplies of the antiviral drug
Tamiflu® during an influenza pandemic or a powerful antibiotic such as Ciproo
during an anthrax scare.
The term "worried well" is itself somewhat misleading because it implies
that people who are not at any risk at all (who are well) will unnecessarily con-
sume response resources. In many disaster situations, however, the "worried
well" category will be blurry at best; the question will instead be one of relative
risk. Moreover, this situation arises not only in the context of public health
emergencies but in many other kinds of disasters for which evacuations are neces-
sary. Returning to the TMI example, the governor recommended that 3500
pregnant women and children within five miles of the plant evacuate.221 The
public, however, self-evacuated in numbers far exceeding these recommendations:
Some 200,000 people evacuated.222 This so-called "shadow evacuation"-self-
evacuation beyond the limits of official evacuation orders-of 200,000 residents
who were at lesser risk than the pregnant women and children within five miles
of the plant significantly delayed and impeded the evacuation of some of those
most at risk by dogging the roads with traffic.223 Additionally, traffic might im-
pede not only evacuation of the public but also arrival of emergency responders
(such as ambulances and firefighters) at a disaster scene. In these scenarios,
transportation resources and road access, rather than drugs and medical re-
sources, are the response resources potentially being hoarded by those who are
less at risk.
Faced with such a possibility, a government official might decide to distort
information about risk in order to assure that limited response resources reach
those most in need. For example, she might publicly announce that there is vir-
220. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CRISIS AND EMERGENCY RISK
COMMUNICATION 13 (2002).
221. See Three Mile IslandA Chronology, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1989, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nationalongterm/tmi/stories/chronoO32889.htm.
222. See id.
223. See Michael Doyle, Urban Mass Evacuation in the United States, in URBANIZATION, POLICING
AND SECURITY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 198 (Gary Cordner et al. eds., 2010) (describing
how shadow evacuation during the Three Mile Island (TMI) incident caused such massive trafflc jams
that some "who were supposed to evacuate turn~ed] around and return[ed] home"'); see also id. (de-
scribing severe traffic jams during the 2005 Huricane Rita evacuation caused by shadow evacuation).
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tually no risk at all to those outside the five-mile evacuation radius, even if that is
not the case.224 In a health scare, she might choose to underplay the risk to people
in certain geographic areas or with certain health characteristics or to overplay the
risks associated with treatment (such as an experimental vaccine) in order to dis-
courage those at lower risk from hoarding treatment resources. When these ac-
tions are challenged, she may justify her information withholding choices by
employing the rhetoric of disaster-wars to suggest that these worried well were
enemies of those truly at risk and that distorting information was an appropriate
mechanism for responding to that threat.
c. The "Overly Complacent"
Another potential candidate for enemy construction in disasters framed as
war are a group that might be called the "overly complacent"-those who are reti-
cent to comply with government recommendations because they are not con-
vinced the risks warrant protective action. The primary information flow tool
government might be tempted to employ in the war against the overly compla-
cent is likely to be overplaying the relevant risks in its communications with the
public to encourage compliance. For example, a local official who believes that an
evacuation is necessary might exaggerate the probability or likely magnitude of a
hurricane to spur recalcitrant citizens to comply with her evacuation order.
Alternatively, the government might be inclined to deny the public infor-
mation in the form of evacuation orders during a current disaster because it fears
that, if an order turns out to be unnecessary, people will become more complacent
and less likely to comply with an evacuation order the next time one is issued.
This "warning fatigue" could potentially be a serious problem especially for dense
urban areas where the long evacuation times required to evacuate large popula-
224. One might contend that some version of this type of information distortion played out in the lead up
to Hurricane Ike in 2008. Officials wanted to ensure that residents of Galveston, Texas, which was
likely to be hardest hit by Ike, could evacuate, and they thus encouraged residents in nearby Houston
to shelter in place to avoid traffic congestion that would impede the evacuation of Galveston and
other low-lying areas. Houston Told to "Hunker Down"for Big Ike, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 2:21
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-4438395.html (noting that authorities hoped to
avoid the "panic" that accompanied Hurricane Rita in 2005 when evacuation orders "sent millions
scurrying in fright and caused a monumental traffic jam"). While the government officials did not
say that Houston residents were not at risk, they arguably downplayed the likely severity of the storm
in Houston when they urged Houston residents to "hunker down," rather than evacuate, explaining
that "[t]he winds will blow and they'll howl and we'll get a lot of rain, but if you lose power and need
to leave, you can do that later." Id. Perhaps a more forthright approach would have been to explain
clearly to Houston residents that, while Ike would likely do serious damage in Houston, it posed far
greater risks to Galveston residents and Houston residents needed to stay off the roads to speed
Galveston's evacuation.
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tions mean that evacuations must be called relatively far in advance, before-for
example-a hurricane's path is known225 or the danger at a nuclear facility in
trouble can be carefily judged.
d. The "Dissenters" or "Impeders"
During wartime, those who criticize or oppose government actions are
often cast as disloyal enemies of the state.2 6 The same tendency to expect people
to "rally 'round the flag" during disaster wars may result in the construction of en-
emies out of those who publicly question or disparage the government's chosen
response measures, or even those who simply seek to subject that response to
public scrutiny by exposing what is actually occurring. In the aftermath of the BP
oil spill, for instance, the federal government implied that at least some of those
who wanted access to affected beaches sought access, not just to document the
extent and effects of the spill and the use of dispersants (to which many objected),
but to impede the response and damage the boom being constructed to contain
and trap oil. Indeed, Thad Allen, who employed a wide array of war rhetoric in
leading the federal response to the spill, identified as potential enemies in the
fight not just the oil but those who might vandalize the boom or otherwise im-
pede the governmental response.227 This enemy construction helped justify ac-
cess restrictions that stonewalled those who wanted more information about
damaged beaches, the use of dispersants, and other controversial response
measures. This category of constructed enemies may also include the press, who
may be accused of physically obstructing response efforts by their mere presence.
CNN reporter Anderson Cooper protested government restrictions on media ac-
cess to the BP spill response, arguing that journalists are "not the enemy here"
and that journalists had no desire to impede or "disrupt[] relief efforts." 228
225. See Eva Regnier, Public Evacuation Decisions and Hurricane Track Uncertainty, 54 MGMT. SCL. 16,17
(2008) (quantifying the hurricane forecasting errors associated with the increased evacuation lead
times required for "major population centers" and discussing the associated "false alarm rates"); Lisa
Grow Sun, Smart Growth in Dumb Places: Sustainability, Disaster, and the Future ftheAmerican City,
2011 BYU L. REV. 2157, 2167.
226. See STONE, supra note 75, at 13.
227. See infra note 303 and accompanying text. By this time, the slide from BP as enemy to dissenting
civilians as potential enemies was already underway.
228. Anderson Cooper36ODegrees: The Spill and Transparency (CNN television broadcast July 1, 2010).
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e. The"Lawless"
As the events during Katrina demonstrate, government might engage in
the construction of at least some disaster victims as lawless enemies of public or-
der and the public good. Indeed, public officials played a critical role in the vilify-
ing of Katrina survivors and in survivors' public construction as a wartime enemy.
It was Governor Blanco whose inflammatory comments suggested that troops
on the ground in New Orleans would shoot to kill.229 It was New Orleans
Mayor Ray Nagin who told Oprah Winfrey on national television that hurri-
cane survivors had plunged into an "almost animalistic state" after "five days
watching dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people [and] raping peo-
ple."230 And it was New Orleans Police Department Superintendent Edwin P.
Compass who announced to the world that "little babies [were] getting raped" in
the Superdome. 23' Aside from the effect characterizing New Orleans as a war
zone may have had on press access,232 this construction of purportedly "lawless"
enemies did not result in information withholding during Katrina, but similar
enemy construction in a future disaster might well be invoked to rationalize even
more serious restrictions on disaster information flow.
2. Critiques ofEnemy Construction
a. Constructed Disaster Enemies Are Categorically Different From
Wartime Thinking Enemies
The thinking nature of the war enemy-and that enemy's ongoing tactical
desire to exploit public information to do the country further harm-is critical to
the legitimacy of the war exception to government transparency. Constructed
disaster enemies will almost always lack these fundamental characteristics and are
thus categorically different from wartime enemies. Accordingly, the construction
and invocation of these "enemies" should not be sufficient to justify importing
wartime transparency exceptionalism into these other disaster contexts.
The "panicking public" enemy is easiest to distinguish from the thinking
enemy of terrorism. Indeed, the rationale for withholding information to
stave off panic identifies the public not as a thinking enemy who will exploit
229. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
230. Brian Thevenot, Myth-Making in New Orleans, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2005-Jan. 2006,
http://www.ajr.org/artideprintable.asp?id=3998 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Oprah Reports, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/oprahshow/
oprahshow1 ss_20050906/2.
232. See infra notes 279-287 and accompanying text.
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government disaster information to do farther harm but instead as a foolish and
irrational (even unthinking) enemy whose poor response to disaster information
unintentionally exacerbates their own risk. The primary justification, then, for
information control to tamp down panic rests on a paternalistic notion that, if
people are going to be their own worst enemies and act in ways that increase their
exposure to harm during disasters, government should protect the public from its
own flawed impulses by manipulating the public understanding of the situation.
In the face of the substantial uncertainty that many disasters create, there of-
ten will be little reason to think that official decisionmaking is superior to indi-
vidual weighing of the risks. However, even if official decisionmaking is more
likely to get it "right" than individual decisionmaking, there is something par-
ticularly offensive about distorting or withholding information in order to ma-
nipulate people's disaster response choices. As outlined in Part I, information
paternalism-by which government seeks to influence individual belief for-
mation by restricting information it deems harmful-evinces a clear lack of re-
spect for citizens and interferes with both individual autonomy and government
accountability.233
While government-imposed restrictions on taking certain protective actions
would also infringe on people's autonomy, at least citizens would then be in a po-
sition to understand and protest those restrictions and hold officials accountable.
Information restrictions or distortions, in contrast, interfere in a more funda-
mental way with people's decisionmaking and ability to hold their leaders
accountable. 34 Indeed, outside of the emergency context, information withhold-
ing is not generally viewed as an appropriate response to differing views about
the proper response to risk. Both the general principles of the Freedom of
Information Act,235 and the more specific mandates of the Emergency Planning
and Community-Right-to-Know Act,236 reflect a commitment to public disclo-
sure of risks that communities face.237
233. See supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text; cf ANNAs, supra note 92, at 217 (arguing that it is
"wrong and dangerous" in a public health emergency "for our government to treat its citizens either
as enemies to be controlled by force or children to be pacified with platitudes").
234. Moreover, paternalism in the face of risks that can quite easily be quantified (and for which
rationality may more easily be judged), seems quite different as a practical-if not a moral-matter
than attempted paternalism in the face of true uncertainty when government can hardly purport to
have a full and accurate understanding ofwhat is best for its citizens.
235. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2006).
237. See, e.g., id. § 11023(h) (mandating that toxic chemical "release forms" required by the statute be
available to the public to inform "citizens of communities surrounding covered facilities" about
toxic chemical releases in their area).
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The worried well (who may be considered a subset of the panicking public)
arguably have more in common with the thinking enemy of war and terrorism
than the panicking public at large because their actions may selfishly compromise
the safety of others as they hoard or consume resources needed by those most at
risk. Because of this potential risk to others, the worried well deserve separate
consideration as potential enemies whose existence might justify information
suppression, as the rationales for doing so extend beyond paternalism.
At least two factors, however, distinguish the worried well from the proto-
typical thinking enemy of war or terrorism. First, they differ radically from the
thinking enemy in how they use information. In contrast to a terrorist who ex-
ploits government information about public vulnerabilities to plan a second attack,
the worried well would not be exploiting the government information to do fur-
ther planned harm with that specific information. In most situations, the worried
well do not actually wield government-provided information as a weapon in and
of itself Rather, the government would be withholding or distorting infor-
mation, not to prevent its exploitation, but to keep people in the dark about their
own circumstances and risk in hopes that they would be dissuaded from overre-
acting and unnecessarily consuming limited resources. The analytical difference
between a terrorist who uses information about a structural vulnerability in a
power grid to plan a deliberate attack on that structure and a citizen using that
same information to decide to hoard generators is a difference in kind, not merely
of degree. It is a difference that makes the war analogy, and the information-flow
exceptionalism that accompanies it, inapt.
Second, and relatedly, intentions can and should matter. The worried well
lack any kind of specific intent to do other disaster victims harm (even if they are
aware that their actions may make it more difficult for others to avoid harm).
When they consume response resources, they usually do so out of a genuine belief
that those actions are (or at least may be) necessary to keep themselves and their
families safe. The rhetoric of the war on terror has already gone a considerable
distance in erasing the moral significance of intent in the identification of ene-
mies.238 As Professor Ann Mongoven has argued in the context of the 'War on
Disease":
Contemporary political rhetoric on terrorism provides an explicit met-
aphorical bridge for the implicit ... conceptual leap from conceiving of
medicine as war to conceiving of diseased persons as the enemy. In
the wake of 9/11, President Bush proclaimed that any nation or person
harboring terrorists would themselves be considered terrorists. What
238. See Mongoven, supra note 172, at 414.
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is notable about the statement is its lack of intent. The president did
not say "anyone who knowingly or willingly harbors terrorists will
themselves be considered terrorists."239
Disaster war rhetoric that builds on this rhetoric likewise threatens to obscure the
importance ofintent in defining true enemies.
Intentionality matters both as a moral matter and because government usu-
ally has more tools at its disposal-beyond information control-to prevent harm
caused unintentionally than harm caused intentionally. For example, govern-
ment is unlikely to be successful, at least in the short term, in persuading or edu-
cating terrorists to abandon their goals. In the case of the worried well, however,
both before and during the disaster, government can educate the public about the
risks that might be confronted. It can take other planning measures-publicized
to the public-to reassure the public that communities will be in a good posi-
tion to deal effectively with disasters and resulting shortages. When these other
information-friendly avenues exist, government should not be allowed to resort
to information control to achieve its ends. If stronger measures are still needed,
the government can regulate the community-harming behavior itself rather than
patronizingly assuming that this behavior necessarily will result from an honest
flow of information. It can set up roadblocks to prevent early evacuation from
areas not truly at risk. It can seize supplies of vaccine or needed medicines or
implement other restrictions to prevent hoarding.to
This same basic analysis applies to both the "overly complacent" and "dis-
senters" who, to the extent they do harm to others (by, for example, endangering
first responders who attempt to rescue those who failed to comply with evacua-
tion orders), do so unintentionally and do not wield public information as a
weapon to harm others.
Thus, the "lawless" who resort to looting and violence after disasters are the
only constructed enemy who may truly resemble the thinking enemy of war and
terrorism." They might, for example, exploit information about what neigh-
borhoods are most affected by the disaster to decide which homes to target.
However, as the next Subpart will demonstrate, the assumption that lawlessness
will be a major problem after most disasters is without empirical support.
239. Id at 410-11.
240. See discussion supra Part I.B. Government decisionmakers (and their constituents) should, however,
be skeptical of claims that such measures are appropriate, absent demonstrated, verified need.
241. Law enforcement-transparency exceptions, also premised on thinking-enemy notions, may be
relevant in cases ofpostdisaster crime, just as they are in other criminal contexts. See supra note 116.
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b. Enemy Construction Rests on Faulty Empirical Assumptions
In addition to suggesting falsely that enemies akin to thinking enemies lurk
in the shadows of every disaster, disaster enemy construction typically rests on a
number of faulty empirical assumptions, including the assumptions that those
experiencing disaster will panic and engage in antisocial, criminal behavior.
No one disputes that many disaster survivors will experience fear. Never-
theless, leading disaster sociologists long ago concluded that the belief that panic
is a common reaction to disasters is a "disaster myth"-a widely held misconcep-
tion about postdisaster human behavior.242 Indeed, even though disaster panic is
apparently presupposed by even preeminent transparency scholars, 243 sociologists
contend that the finding that postdisaster "panic is rare" is one of "the most ro-
bust conclusions" to emerge from more than fifty years of disaster sociological re-
search.244 "Regardless of whether the hazard is dramatic or mundane, whether
there is a low or high body-count, or whether the threat is acute or chronic, social
scientists agree that 'panic' explains little that is important about how people, in
collectivities, respond to disaster."245 Thus far, this finding appears to hold true
across the spectrum of disasters, including natural disasters, technological disas-
ters, and even terrorist events, 246 although no one has systematically studied po-
tential differences between the likelihood of panic across categories of disaster.247
Despite this apparently robust sociological consensus, any discussion of the
potential for panic in response to disasters is complicated by ambiguity in the
ig * 1)248term panic and lack of clarity about its precise contours.24 Even among sociol-
242. See E.L. Quarantelli & Russell R Dynes, When Disaster Strikes (It Isn't Much Like What You've Heard
& Read About), PSYCHOL. TODAY, Feb. 1972, at 66, 67-68; see also Sun, supra note 152, at 1134-
35 (describing disaster myths identified by sociologists).
243. See Pozen, supra note 7, at 283 (noting that Center for Disease Control and Prevention "officials may
conclude it is better" to suppress information about the very existence of a new disease outbreak
because revealing the virus "would risk creating widespread panic and stigmatizing those who have
contracted if').
244. Lee Clarke & Caron Chess, Elites and Panic:More to Fear Than Fear ltsef 87 Soc. FORCES 993, 993
(2008) (pointing to research "on supper club fires, airplane crashes, epidemics, hurricanes and so on").
245. Id. (citation omitted).
246. Id. at 994; see also William L. Waugh, Jr., Terrorism as Disaster, in HANDBOOK OF DISASTER
RESEARCH, supra note 215, at 400 (noting that there was "no panic' at Chemobyl, during the 1995
Tokyo subway sarin attack, or during "the World Trade Center collapses" (citations omitted)).
247. Clarke &Chess, supra note 244, at 994-95 (acknowledging that, while the distinction between types
of disasters has been questioned, it "has not yet been obliterated" and suggesting that "[w]e would ...
benefit from a thorough assessment of the occurrence and conditions of panic in 'natural' and
'technological' disasters").
248. In the legal scholarship on emergency powers, the debate about panic after September 11 has focused
on the potential for "political panic," in which reactions to disasters-primarily, if not exclusively,
terrorist attacks-generate sufficient levels of anxiety among the public or political officials (or both)
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ogists there has been substantial disagreement about exactly what panic means.
E.L. Quarantelli, one of the seminal scholars of disaster sociology, has ex-
plained that the term panic has typically been used to describe either "extreme
and groundless fear,"4 9 or "flight behavior. . . marked by the setting aside of eve-
ryday social norms."250 Moreover, he notes that panic is often characterized as
"irrational" and "maladaptive," on the one hand, or associated with "ruthless
competition," predominantly "selfish behavior" and "breakdown" of the social or-
der, on the other.25' Of course, these are two quite different conceptions of panic,
whether applied to flight or some other postdisaster behavior: one focused on irra-
tional behavior, presumably as measured against some objective standard, the
other focused on antisocial behavior that violates everyday social norms.252
In any event, sociologists continue to insist that their research findings bear
out the conclusion that panic is rare, regardless of which definition is at play.
Does this sociological research, then, provide support for the conclusion that, for
example, people will not react "irrationally' to disasters? The notion of irrational-
ity is, of course, a contested concept that requires adoption of some standard by
that government adopts and implements policies that overweight security at the expense of civil
liberties. See ACKERMAN, supra note 201, at 1-2 (arguing that cycles of panic after terrorist attacks
will create intense demand for counterterrorism mechanisms that restrict civil liberties). In contrast,
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have disputed the political "panic thesis," Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND
ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY, supra note 3, at 72-that "during an emergency people panic,
and when they panic they support policies that are unwise and excessive," id at 57. They argue that
fear can have both positive and negative effects on decisionmaking, that fear is unlikely to have much
effect on "policy during emergencies" (at least not more than during normal times), and that, in any
event, any negative effects of fear on decisionmaking cannot be effectively mitigated, id. at 72-73.
This notion of "political panic' appears to have more in common with the sociological notion of
"moral panic," than with the kind of panic with which sociologists and this Article are most
concerned: the panic often believed to characterize people's immediate, individual reactions to seek
safety in the aftermath of disasters. The concept of "political panic" does not, however, precisely
track the sociological concept of "moral panic," because sociologists usually limit moral panics to
threats to "values or a sense of propriety," rather than threats to physical safety. See Clarke & Chess,
supra note 244, at 996. Interestingly, at least one legal scholar who advocates the need to protect
against post-terrorism political panic also suggests the likelihood of at least some garden-variety
panic of the kind sociologists dispute. ACKERMAN, supra note 201, at 1 ("In speaking of panic, I
don't wish to conjure images of frantic people pointlessly running about-although there will be
some of that.").
249. E.L. Quarantelli, Panii Sociology of in 20 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
ANDBEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11,020, 11,021 (NeilJ. Smelser &Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
250. Id.
251. Id at11,021-22.
252. See Clarke &Chess, supra note 244, at 997-98. Lee Clarke, another prominent expert on panic, has
abandoned the definition of panic as an "excessive feeling of alarm or fear . .. leading to extravagant
or injudicious efforts to secure safety," id at 996, and now defines panic as "a breakdown in social
order, a breaking of social bonds, as a result of some fear, which itself creates more danger," id at 998.
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which rationality is to be judged,253 and none of the sociological studies of panic
appear to make any kind of dose analysis of the rationality of particular survivors'
actions, as judged against some precise conception of real risk. 54 Moreover, be-
havioral psychology has long argued that everyday decisionmaking-particularly
in the face of risk and uncertainty-can, and often does, deviate substantially
from models of "rational" decisionmaking. Such decisionmaking is often driven
by heuristics-mental shortcuts that substitute easy questions about a risk (like
how salient a risk is) for harder judgments about the actual likelihood that a risk
will come to pass. 55 Nevertheless, even when heuristics are arguably in play, it
may be unfair to label the public's protective actions in a disaster "irrational."256
253. See id. at 997-98 (rejecting "[t]he 'perceived risk-real risk' dichotomy').
254. Cf Quarantelli, supra note 249, at 11,021 (suggesting that researchers often consider "rational"
behavior to be behavior "where the means-ends relationships are in balance or where the end result is
a positive one" and arguing that disaster behavior is usually "very meaningfiil and far from most
conceptions ofirrationality").
255. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 98 (2011). For example, some types of risk
are particularly "dread" (often because they are manmade, involuntary, and risk irreparable,
irreversible harm) and, when confronted with such dread risk, people sometimes engage in what
Cass Sunstein has labeled "probability neglect." See Sunstein, supra note 196, at 62-63. That is,
when confronted with the question of how to respond to such risks, "people tend to focus on" the
terrible outcome and neglect to consider the (often low) probability that the dread event will actually
occur. See id
256. Dan Kahan and others argue, for instance, that the influence of emotion on risk assessment may
reflect, not irrationality, but culturally informed "expressive appraisals" of the risks at issue. See Dan
M. Kahan, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008).
Moreover, even aside from the cultural critique, it is often difficult to judge in any kind of objective,
quantitative manner whether disaster victims responded rationally to the so-called "real risks."
Consider, for example, the "shadow evacuation" during the TMI incident of some 200,000 people
for whom the government had declined to recommend evacuation. See supra notes 221-223 and
accompanying text. The government decisionmakers who issued the evacuation orders were making
recommendations under conditions of real uncertainty-no one really knew what was happening in
the plant or what the risks truly were. In the academic world, how one should make decisions when
confronting true uncertainty is the subject of much divisive debate. While some advocate continued
attempts to rely on cost-benefit analysis (and thus continued attempts to quant the likelihood and
harm of different possible scenarios), others advocate applying something more like the pre-
cautionary principle, which often involves some measure of risk aversion to the worst case scenario.
See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 893 (2006)
(developing a "Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle" that "is best understood to embody a
form of risk aversion for the most dangerous risks"). Given this kind of divide in the academic
community, it is hardly surprising that members of the public will have differing assessments of the
proper way to react, and may-in the face of uncertainty and incomplete information-focus on
the worst-case scenario (rather than its probability) and decide that evacuation is the best course.
Additionally, given that official disaster decisionmakers also employ heuristics and are often as prone
to decisionmaking biases as the general public, there is little reason to assume that official decisions
are more likely to be more rational than individual decisions made by members of the general public
or that individual choices to defyr government recommendations are necessarily irrational.
Once distilled, the sociological conclusions seem to amount to findings that,
despite the fear, time pressures, and other stressors, observations of disaster survi-
vors suggest that they are not substantially less able postdisaster to make "rea-
soned," thinking decisions than they are in nondisaster circumstances. 257 Those
experiencing disaster are not given to "precipitate and unreasoning behaviour"
unlikely to serve their own interests.258 In many respects, then, disaster deci-
sionmaking and behavior may be more similar to everyday decisionmaking and
behavior than it is different. 259 The research of sociologists who focus on panic as
the breakdown of social norms also points in this direction. As Lee Clarke ex-
pressed it, "The rules of behavior in extreme situations . . . are not much different
from rules of ordinary life."260
Of course, if the norms of disaster behavior largely parallel those of everyday
life, one would expect to see some altruism but also adherence to a preexisting hi-
erarchy of loyalties (for example, to family, fiends, neighbors, acquaintances, and
strangers). Empirical evidence suggests that survivors of some kinds of disasters
(particularly natural disasters) create a kind of altruistic community in which
preexisting social conflicts are suspended for a time to focus on the needs of the
community in the immediate aftermath of disaster; indeed, selfless behavior is
often observed in disaster's aftermath.261 Yet, ongoing adherence to loyalty hier-
archies in disaster situations is probably to be expected, particularly if allegiances
to the various groups conflict. Moreover, individual disaster survivors may not
carefully consider how their own actions-if aggregated across many similarly
257. Quarantelli's assessment that "irrational" panic behavior "is often contrasted with the assumed
rationality of most other behavior," may be read as an implicit endorsement of this more limited
conclusion, that disaster behavior is not much different from "normal" behavior, which may be
flawed in a variety ofways. Quarantelli, supra note 249, at 11,021 (emphasis added).
258. Jones et al., supra note 93, at 70 (citing Thomas A. Glass & Monica Schoch-Spana, Bioterrorism
and the Peple: How to Vaccinate a City Against Panic, 34 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 217,
218 (2002)).
259. This conclusion is generally consistent with the view of Posner and Vermeule that fear's effect on
decisionmaking may be either good or bad, see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 248, at 77, and that
"there is no reason to think that the fear-inspired decisions are likely to be worse," id., although their
view appears less grounded in empirical observational evidence and more in a hypothetical analysis
of the likely effects of fear on decisionmaking, id. Of course, even this more limited conclusion from
the sociological research is open to attack on the grounds that the studies do not and cannot provide
any complete, controlled comparison of everyday and disaster decisionmaking.
260. Press Release, Am. Sociological Ass'n, In Disasters, Panic Is Rare; Altruism Dominates (Aug. 7,
2002), http://www2.asanet.org/media/panic.htmrl.
261. See J. Steven Picou et al., Disaster, Litigation, and the Corrosive Community, 82 SOC. FORCES 1493,
1495 (2004). This does not necessarily appear to be true of all kinds of disasters, at least not in the me-
dium to long run. Over time, for example, the reaction to technological disasters is often the creation
of a more "corrosive community" as conflict about legal liability creates community stress and
division. Id. at 1496.
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situated individuals-could impede those at greater risk from accessing the re-
sources they need. Thus, some behavior of the worried well, such as drug hoard-
ing during a pandemic, might well be expected. Indeed, the phenomenon of
"shadow evacuation" well beyond the limits of official evacuation orders has been
documented in many different disasters.262
Nevertheless, the amount of antisocial behavior in the aftermath of disasters
tends to be greatly exaggerated. In particular, as Katrina illustrates, the disas-
ter myth that violence and looting are common human reactions to disaster often
takes hold in the wake ofdisasters. 263 The empirical evidence confirms, however,
that antisocial behavior is rare, outlier behavior, and that postdisaster looting and
violence are atypical and relatively rare.264 Additionally, much of what might be
characterized as antisocial behavior (short of criminal activity) or panic in the
wake of disasters-such as disobeying government orders to evacuate or shelter
in place-is easily explainable on other grounds. People disobey government
instructions for reasons other than panic or clear antisocial aims. For example, in a
New York Academy of Medicine study of likely public reactions to a dirty bomb
attack, the vast majority of those who reported that they would likely defy a
"shelter-in-place" recommendation did so because they prioritized attempting to
ensure the safety of their children and others dependent on their care.265
While no one can say for sure how the public will react to any particular dis-
aster, particularly an unprecedented event, the alleged danger posed by enemies
that government will be tempted to construct to justify information withholding
will usually lack a strong basis in empirical fact.
c. Information Withholding Is Counterproductive
Even if government were entirely correct in its assumptions that the public
was likely either to panic and overreact or to be overly complacent in the face of
disaster, the denial, omission, or manipulation of information is precisely the
wrong way either to avoid public panic or to ensure compliance with official rec-
ommendations. Indeed, such information withholding is likely to backfire and
subvert the government's alleged goals.
Some sociologists have suggested, for example, that by withholding infor-
mation, government may, in fact, spur panic where little would otherwise have
262. See Doyle, supra note 223, at 198 (documenting instances of shadow evacuation).
263. See generally Sun, supra note 152, and sources cited therein.
264. See id. atl1140-48.
265. See LASKER, supra note 73, at 33.
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existed.266 Moreover, as Part I detailed, withholding disaster information from
the public tends to undermine public trust, which in turn undermines public com-
pliance with government disaster recommendations.26 7
Social science also suggests that the best remedy for potential problems such
as "warning fatigue" is more public information, rather than less. Thus far, stud-
ies of the "cry-wolf' problem have demonstrated that "false alarm[s] that lead[] to
the public taking a protective action such as evacuating" do not significantly affect
compliance rates with future warnings so long as "the bases for the warning and
reasons for the 'miss' are told to the public in question and understood by
them."268 That is, if the public understands why the false alarm occurred-and the
uncertainty public officials faced when deciding whether to issue that warning-
the false alarm will not significantly lower future warning compliance. 69 These
findings suggest that more information, in the form of adequate explanations ex
ante of the uncertainty surrounding warnings and of the reasons the threat did
not materialize ex post, is likely to be the best antidote for warning fatigue.
d. Enemy Construction Risks a Vicious Cycle
As the events during Katrina demonstrate, the relationship between gov-
ernment control of information and enemy construction can run in two direc-
tions. First, government-as described above-can use enemy construction to
justify information withholding. Second, as Katrina illustrates, the government
can attempt to use whatever control over information it has to shape the public
narrative of disaster in order to construct enemies. Official overplaying of the
risks of postdisaster violence-itself a form of information distortion-was key to
the demonization of Katrina survivors and their construction as a wartime ene-
my. 270 Moreover, while the media were, without doubt, key propagators of the
wartime imagery of Katrina, restrictions on journalists attempting to document
266. See BARRY, supra note 214, at 336 (describing how, during the 1918 flu epidemic "the more officials
tried to control [public fear] with half-truths and outright lies, the more the terror spread"); Clarke &
Chess, supra note 244, at 1001-03 (citing 2001 anthrax incident); Glass &Schoch-Spana, supra note
258, at 218 (arguing that, "to the extent it exists," panic in disasters may be "iatrogenic," spurred by
emergency measures (like suppressing information) meant to contain it).
267. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
268. John H. Sorenson & Barbara Vogt Sorenson, Community Processes: Warning and Evacuation, in
HANDBOOK OF DISASTER RESEARCH, supra note 215, at 196-97; see also Sorenson & Mileti,
supra note 215, at 51 (finding "little research evidence" of the "cry-wolf syndrome"). But see
Randolph Burnside, Op-Ed., The 'Cry Woff Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/08/29/what-did-we-learn-from-irene/the-cry-wolf-effect-after-
hurricane-irene (arguing that '"crying wolf syndrome is veryreal and can blind people to real threats").
269. See Sorenson & Sorenson, supra note 268, at 196-97.
270. See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text.
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clashes between security forces and alleged looters27 may nonetheless have
helped government officials perpetuate this narrative of Katrina survivors as ag-
gressive enemies of public order, rather than victims. Similarly, attempts by the
federal govemment to prevent the press from taking pictures of the bodies of
Katrina's victims helped suppress information that might have countered the no-
tion that the citizens of New Orleans were aggressors and enemies rather than
victims. 272
This phenomenon suggests the possibility of a vicious cycle in which infor-
mation control aids enemy construction, and the constructed enemies can then be
invoked to justify further information control and withholding. Thus, govem-
ment attempts to manipulate information to create new enemies warrant both
heightened skepticism and heightened concern.
One might question, of course, how effective the government will be at this
(or any) attempt to control disaster information flow and shape the public narra-
tive of the disaster. Without doubt, the govemment faces numerous obstacles to
effective information control. First, the government is not monolithic and, de-
spite frequent attempts to centralize control of public risk communication during
disasters, conflicting messages from different levels of govemment, or different
agencies, or even different officials within one agency, are quite likely, especially if
an official is deviating from predisaster planning guidance about particular risks.
Second, with the advent of the intemet, social media, and ubiquitous cell phone
cameras, other communicators can now access and distribute firsthand infor-
mation that the government might once have controlled. Third, while some
kinds of disasters are quite opaque in terms of the public's ability to gauge their
own risks (such as a potential meltdown inside a damaged nuclear power plant),
others are more transparent, and the public will be able to compare the govern-
ment's information message to their own experiences. All of these arguments
suggest that, at most, the govemment can hope to delay, rather than completely
prevent, the dissemination oftruthful information about risk.
Nonetheless, the persistence of the early reporting vilifying Katrina survi-
vors suggests that early perceptions of a disaster may have remarkable staying
power. There is also good reason to think, for instance, that the president has a
powerfil first-mover advantage in framing an ongoing disaster. As Justice Jack-
son once wrote, in an emergency, the "drama, magnitude, and finality [of the
president's] decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the
271. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 286--288 and accompanying text.
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public eye and ear."273 The same may be true of some charismatic governors at
the state level. Additionally, while social media could well prove to be a game
changer in more transparent disasters in which connectivity is maintained, the
Japanese earthquake and tsunami serve as a poignant reminder that, even today,
disasters can devastate communication infrastructure and that, for those most af-
fected, radio is often the only effective channel for public communication that
remains.274
e. Enemy Construction Targets the Poor and Minorities
Finally, as the experience of Hurricane Katrina suggests, the segments of
the population most likely to be singled out as "enemies" during a disaster are
poor minority communities and individuals. The identification of enemies is
likely to follow predictable paths, influenced by both racial and class prejudice. 275
Indeed, enemy construction is likely to be the most powerfil, persuasive, and
compelling as a justification for information withholding when the enemy is a
clearly delineated, "well-defined" "other"27 6-an other that unambiguously ex-
cludes most of the affected population.277 Additionally, vulnerable groups are
particularly likely to be constructed as enemies because they are often the most
distrustftl of government and thus the most likely to question and resist compli-
273. Youngstown Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
274. See Izunii Aizu, Japan: In the Aftermath f the Tsunami, in GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY
WATCH 156, 156-57 (Alan Finlay ed., 2011), available at http://giswatch.org/sites/
defaultfiles/gisw_-_japan.pdf (describing how the hardest-hit areas became "information black
holes" for periods ranging from a week to more than a month).
275. Cf Sun, supra note 152, at 1149 (discussing the possible role that class and racial prejudice played in
the public's willingness to credit reports ofwidespread post-Katrina violence in New Orleans).
276. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011,1037 (2003).
277. Id (arguing that "in times of crisis, when emotions run high, the dialectic of 'us-them' . . . allows
people to vent fear and anger in the face of (actual or perceived) danger and to direct negative
emotional energies toward groups or individuals dearly identified as different"). Experience in
Katrina and other disasters bears out this conclusion. See, e.g., Gerwin, supra note 149, at 136 ("The
history of government response to serious threats of disease has frequently included narratives about
majorities marginalizing minority populations and government derogating the rights ... of the
marginalized populations."); see also id. at 138 (quoting BARRY, supra note 214, at 394-95 for the
proposition that blaming "the poor for their own suffering" gave the elite during the 1918 flu
pandemic "some feeling of control, some feeling that the world still made sense"). In the aftermath
of Katrina, for example, the New Orleanians who were constructed as enemies-looters and
criminals-were overwhelmingly poor and black. See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE
RACE CARD: How BLUFFTNGABouT BAS MVAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE 39-49 (2009)
(describing media portrayals of black Katrina survivors "looting," while white survivors were
portrayed as "finding" food).
ance with government recommendations.278 This result is particularly troubling
given that the impacts of disaster are already typically concentrated on poor and
minority populations,279 who may then also be both demonized and deprived of
information about the very substantial risks they face.
B. War Zones
In addition to encouraging enemy construction, the rhetoric of war encour-
ages and justifies public officials' transformation of disaster-affected public spaces
into war zones where information is controlled and from which the public and
press are partially or wholly excluded. While there is little doubt that areas rav-
aged by disaster can resemble a war zone-a place where there is both devastation
and ongoing danger-and that some access restrictions are justified by genuine
safety concerns, labeling domestic disaster sites as "war zones" tends to suggest to
the official mind that they have both unfettered power and compelling justifica-
tion to dose such areas to public scrutiny. This war mentality may embolden
public officials in adopting overbroad limitations on access to the area, and the
war framing may help disguise other, less public-serving motivations for such ac-
cess limitations. Limited public and press access to disaster sites, in turn, limits
public information about the incident, response measures taken to manage the
disaster, and the ongoing risks to public safety. This "war zone" transformation
has been observed in the aftermath of Katrina, during wildfires, and in the re-
sponse to the BP oil spill.
The repeated identification ofpost-Katrina New Orleans as a "war zone,"280
and the heavy military and police presence that rhetoric justified, likely contribut-
ed to restrictions on journalists' ability to observe and document the official re-
sponse, as well as the terrible human toll of the disaster. At least some journalists
in post-Katrina New Orleans encountered official resistance from both military
and law enforcement personnel to their attempts to cover the Katrina disaster and
the bungled governmental response. NBC News anchor Brian Williams, for ex-
ample, reported that a sergeant prevented him from photographing a National
Guard unit "taking up positions outside a Brooks Brothers on the edge of the
278. LASKER, supra note 73, at ii (describing higher levels of distrust of disaster information among
African Americans, Hispanics, and lower-income individuals).
279. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 204 (2d ed. 2010) (describing
how disasters expose the social vulnerabilities of racial minorities and the poor and magnify social
injustice).
280. See supra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
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[French] Quarter."28 Williams later protested that he could not imagine any jus-
tification for preventing him from "reporting in a calm and heavily defended Amer-
ican city. "282 Williams also recounted how an "out of town" police officer who
"apparently... thought reporters were encroaching on the scene" of a post-Katrina
fire, "raised the muzzle of her weapon and aimed it at members of the media ...
obvious members of the media. . . armed only with notepads."283 Even after the
New Orleans Convention Center and Superdome were secured, journalists re-
ported that the National Guard refused journalists access to those shelters.284
Moreover, much like Pentagon attempts to restrict media photographs of
"flag-draped caskets returning from Iraq,"285 FEMA attempted to dissuade jour-
nalists from photographing the bodies of Katrina victims, thereby discouraging
journalists from capturing and conveying the fiull impact of the storm.
86 Some
Louisiana officials may have taken this policy further,a287as one Washington Post
reporter described overhearing a "sergeant from a state agency telling a camera
crew allowed on a boat in a flooded area near downtown New Orleans: 'If we
catch you photographing one body, we're going to bring you back in and throw
you off the boat."' 288 This apparent attempt to downplay the true human cost of
the disaster on those left behind in New Orleans, while overplaying the violence
of Katrina survivors and constructing post-Katrina New Orleanians as lawless
enemies of public order, is in some respects the most pernicious combination im-
aginable, as it both minimizes the suffering of victims (thus minimizing govern-
ment responsibility) and implicitly blames the victims themselves for whatever
suffering did occur.
Wildfires provide other examples of the transformation of public areas af-
fected by disaster into disaster war zones to which public access is limited. The
wildfire war zones, from which members of the press are often excluded and resi-
dents may be forcibly evacuated, can extend well beyond those areas directly af-
fected by the fire. 289 During the 2002 Biscuit Fire in southern Oregon, "[t]he
entire Siskiyou National Forest-over 17,000 square miles-was closed to the
281. Brian Williams, Daily Nightly: Predicting Disaster, MSNBC.coM (Sept 7, 2005, 4:30 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9216831.
282. Howard Kurtz, Standing in the Way of a Good Story, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005, httpi//www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artide/2005/09/08/AR2005090802121.html.
283. Williams,supra note 281.
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public."290 As one former firefighter and longtime observer of federal firefighting
policy observed:
Armed federal agents, at times even supplemented with actual military
personnel, enforce the [sweeping] closures to ensure that members of
the public or the press do not infiltrate into fire camps or combat
zones. Much as occurred on the Grenada invasion and the Gulf War,
reporters are herded around fires in official press pools.... In this mili-
tarized situation of highly restricted access and tightly controlled in-
formation, the public is utterly dependent on the government's version
of events.291
Restrictions on media access to several wildfires raging in the western Unit-
ed States during the summer of 2012 are illustrative of these concerns. During
the June 2012 High Park Fire west of Fort Collins, Colorado, Larimer County
Sheriff Jeff Smith-who said that firefighters' efforts in his county were not a
"single battle" but a long "campaign"292-prevented journalists from accessing
evacuated areas for eleven days, a restriction that reports described as "unusual. . .
even for this state, where local officials have extensive powers at fire scenes and
journalists are usually kept miles from the flames."
293  Elsewhere, in Washoe
County, Nevada, a photojournalist documenting a local "brush fire . . . was
roughed up, handcuffed and cited for obstruction."294
The response to the BP oil spill was also marked by the transformation of
public beachfront and waters into war zones where public access was sharply cur-
tailed. The New York Times reported that "jiournalists struggling to document
the impact of the oil rig explosion have repeatedly found themselves turned away
from public areas affected by the spill, and not only by BP and its contractors, but
by local law enforcement, the Coast Guard and government officials."295 Indeed,
while many access restrictions and gags on speaking with BP employees may have
290. Id. ("Citizens could not set foot anywhere on the forest, even on areas several miles away from the
wildfire or any suppression activities.").
291. Timothy Ingalsbee, The War on Wildfire: Firefighting and the Militarization of Forestry, FIRE-
EcOLOGY.ORG, http://www.fire-ecology.org/research/war onwildfire.htm (last visited Mar.
11,2013).
292. Joey Bunch &Kieran Nicholson, Colorado Wildfire: HighPark Fire Hits 58,770Acres EvenAs Wind
Calm, DENVER POST (June 19, 2012, 5:13 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/recommended/
ci_20886632.
293. Dan Elliott, Public to Get First Close Look at Big Colorado Wildfire, AP BIG STORY (June 20, 2012,
6:01 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/ar ticle/law-enforcement-restricts-media-wildfire-coverage.
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originated with BP, ample evidence suggests that local officials were often com-
plicit with BP in enforcing these restrictions.296
The Coast Guard itself, moreover, established a sixty-five-foot "safety
zone," making it a federal felony to come within sixty-five feet of a boom or "oil
spill response operations" without explicit authorization from the Coast Guard.297
An Associated Press reporter noted the parallels to embedded reporters covering
military campaigns in Afghanistan, explaining that "[tjhere is a continued effort
to keep control over the access. . . [a] nd even in places where the government is
cooperating with us to provide access, it's still a problem because it's still access
obtained through the government."298 It is difficult to escape the conclusion that
the notion that the country was at war-at times with the oil, at times with BP,
and at times with intermeddlers like the press who might impede the official re-
sponse operations-emboldened government officials to limit the public's ability
to witness and document both the scope of the harm and any flaws in the gov-
ernment response. Indeed, Admiral Thad Allen explicitly used the rhetoric ofwar
to justify the overreaching access restrictions. 299
C. The "Fog ofWar"
During disasters, public officials have frequently invoked the "fog of war" to
characterize the difficulties of obtaining accurate and complete real-time infor-
mation as a disaster unfolds. For example, GregoryJaczko, Chairman of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, described the lack of accurate information at
the height of the Fukushima crisis as the "fog of war." A/While there are indeed
some similarities between the challenges of obtaining ftll, accurate, timely infor-
296. See, e.., id. (describing how a local sheriff informed reporters to whom a BP contractor refused beach
access that "news media had to fill out paperwork and then be escorted by a BP official to get access
to the beach").
297. See Press Release, U.S. Gov't, Coast Guard Establishes 20-Meter Safety Zone Around All
Deepwater Horizon Protective Boom; Operations (June 30, 2010), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/
release/2010/06/30/coast-guard-establishes-20-meter-safety-zone-around-all-deepwater-horizon-
protect. The restrictions on boom access were modified after journalist protests. See Press Release,
Nat'lPress Photographers Ass'n, Coast Guard Lifts Boom Ban; Announces New Media Procedures
(July 13,2010), https://nppa.org/news/875.
298. Peters, supra note 295 (quoting Michael Oreskes, Senior Managing Editor at the Associated Press).
299. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
300. Brian Wingfield, Fukushima Disaster Lft U.S. ARC Confrse4 Documents Show, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-27/fukushima-disaster-left-
u-s-nrc-confused-documents-show.htnil ("The transcripts highlight what Jaczko called the 'fog of
war' as the agency responded to the world's worst nuclear disaster in 25 years. The agency's
information about developments, provided by local officials, news media and Tokyo Electric Power
Co., owner of Fukushima Dai-Ichi, created a chaotic environment where details weren't always
accurate.").
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mation during wars and during disasters, invoking the "fog of war" during disas-
ters can disguise the fact that at least some disaster communication difficulties are
caused by inadequate predisaster preparationso' and can quickly become an excuse
for delaying the conveyance of existing (albeit incomplete) information,302 or for
being sloppy about tailoring access limitations to the true exigencies at hand. In
one notable instance, Admiral Thad Allen, who led the federal response to the
BP spill, implicitly acknowledged that the restrictions imposed on public access
to damaged beaches and waters-including making it a federal felony to be near a
boom-were overbroad and confusing, but then explained that "[t] hings happen
in the fog ofwar."sos
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated above, the expansion of wartime transparency excep-
tionalism is more extensive than has previously been appreciated, and its invoca-
tion in nonthinking-enemy disasters carries with it ramifications that are, as a
practical and theoretical matter, as serious, if not more serious, than those that
have been the exclusive focus of our constitutional dialogue on war exceptionalism
for the last decade. The melding of war and disaster, reflected in both legislation
and official rhetoric,leads the government to construct enemies from whom it can
justifiably withhold information, to transform public spaces into war zones from
301. Cf Laurie A. Johnson & Robert B. Olshansky, Recovery of the Whole Community (unpublished
manuscript), available at https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/images/file/symposiums/Community
Recovery fromDisaster/introduction-dayl.pdf (suggesting postdisaster planning as an antidote to
the "fog of war" that occurs "during an emergency and the early days following a disaster" because
"actions often must happen fast [sic] than information flows").
302. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER COOPER & ROBERT BLOCK, DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA AND
THE FAILURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 131-33 (2007) (suggesting that during the Katrina
disaster, Matthew Broderick, a "retired Marine brigadier general' who served as Director of the
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) during the catastrophe and was one of the White
House's chief advisors, was so wary of 'the fog of war' and the unreliability of first reports" that he
delayed conveying key information about the failure of New Orleans' flood control system to the
White House because the reports (which "included eye-witness information, ground details with
multiple corroborating sources, and even facts gathered specifically by people reporting directly to the
HSOC") did not meet his "rigorous standard" for confirmation); Joe Hagan &Joseph T. Hallinan,
Why Levee Breaches in New Orleans Were Late-Breaking News, WALL ST. J., Sept 12, 2005,
http://online.wsj.com/public/artide/SB112649152397237699-8_20060912.html (quoting,
as explanation for the Army Corps of Engineers' delay in disseminating information about breaches
of New Orleans' flood control system, the assertion of Corp spokesman John Rickey that "the 'fog of
war' and 'massive logistical problems with communications in the hours after the storm hit' created
some conffision").
303. SAFINA, supra note 193 at 277. Other than citing the "fog of war," Mlen did not explain why the
federal government chose to criminalize proximity to the booms rather than creating a narrower
prohibition on vandalizing or otherwise damaging the booms. Id. at 276-77.
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which citizens and press can be more easily excluded, and to invoke "fog of war"
excuses for communication failures. The aggregation of war with these dissimilar
disasters that lack a thinking enemy is particularly troubling because it subverts
the background norm of transparency that should exist during disasters and is
likely to distract from or overshadow the more careful and nuanced balancing of
other competing values that might warrant narrower exceptions to this norm.
Now is the time to use this new awareness of the conflation of war and dis-
aster to critically assess the tone and language used to convey disaster information
and policy, the care with which legislative exceptions to transparency are crafted,
the common treatment of disparate types of events in emergency power legisla-
tion more generally, and the structure of agencies and entities with responsibili-
ties during these critical times.
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